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ABSTRACT 
  The New Orleans criminal justice system collapsed after Hurricane 
Katrina, resulting in a constitutional crisis. Eight thousand people, 
mostly indigent and charged with misdemeanors such as public 
drunkenness or failure to pay traffic tickets, languished indefinitely in 
state prisons. The court system shut its doors, the police department 
fell into disarray, few prosecutors remained, and a handful of public 
defenders could not meet with, much less represent, the thousands 
detained. This dire situation persisted for many months, long after the 
system should have been able to recover. We present a narrative of the 
collapse of the New Orleans area criminal system after Hurricane 
Katrina. Not only did this perfect storm illuminate how unprepared 
our local criminal systems may remain for a severe natural disaster or 
terrorist attack, but it raised unique and underexplored constitutional 
questions. We argue that constitutional criminal procedure failed to 
serve its protective role during this emergency, while deferential rules 
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rooted in federalism had the unanticipated effect of hindering 
provision of critical federal emergency assistance, and perhaps most 
important, longstanding local neglect rendered the system vulnerable 
to collapse. We conclude by imagining systems designed to safeguard 
the provision of criminal justice during emergencies. 
INTRODUCTION 
Hurricane Katrina washed away the New Orleans criminal 
justice system. As residents evacuated, the jail flooded to inmates’ 
chests and police scrambled to enforce order without any 
communication. The water receded weeks later revealing “thousands 
of detainees awaiting hearings and trials . . . thrust into a legal limbo 
without courts, trials, or lawyers”1 resulting in what one judge called 
“a ‘constitutional crisis.’”2 This dire situation lasted not just during the 
initial period of severe disruption, but for upwards of a year. While 
courts eventually reopened, they failed to act as eight thousand 
people languished for months “doing Katrina time” in prisons. Most 
were arrested for petty offenses such as public drunkenness, reading 
tarot cards without a permit, or failure to pay traffic tickets, and then 
detained based solely on a police affidavit. Most then served long past 
their likely sentences without ever receiving a judicial hearing.3 Nor 
did these thousands of detainees, mostly indigent, meet with lawyers. 
Only six public defenders remained in New Orleans, which the Chief 
Judge of the criminal court called “a full-blown disaster.”4 In effect, 
Louisiana courts suspended habeas corpus for six months. The United 
States has rarely experienced such a rapid and complete collapse of 
local law enforcement, a district attorney’s office, the indigent defense 
 
 1. Peter Applebome & Jonathan D. Glater, Storm Leaves Legal System a Shambles, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1. 
 2. Laura Parker, People arrested before Katrina still await trial, USA TODAY, Feb. 27, 
2006, at A4; Morning Edition: Evacuated Prisoners Held in Limbo After Katrina (NPR radio 
broadcast Oct. 25, 2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4973246& 
ampsourceCode=RSS (last visited Sept. 12, 2006). 
 3. See Gwen Filosa, Katrina leaves inmates in limbo: Many still jailed are ‘doing Katrina 
time,’ TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 18, 2006, at B1 (“[P]eople have been held after their release 
dates, some of whom should have been out before Katrina.”); ACLU NATIONAL PRISON 
PROJECT, ABANDONED AND ABUSED: ORLEANS PARISH PRISONERS IN THE WAKE OF 
HURRICANE KATRINA 13 (Aug. 2006) [hereinafter ACLU REPORT], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/oppreport20060809.pdf (noting that 60 percent of inmates were 
held on attachments, traffic violations or municipal charges). 
 4. Michael Perlstein, Public defender cases in limbo: Indigent program broken, judge says, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 11, 2006, at A1. 
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system, jails, and criminal courts. A perfect storm illuminated how 
unprepared a local criminal system may remain for a severe natural 
disaster or terrorist attack. 
The nearly unprecedented collapse of Louisiana criminal justice 
institutions and the mass detentions that resulted raise unique 
constitutional questions. We argue that constitutional criminal 
procedure rules failed to serve their intended protective roles during 
the emergency due to the institutional collapse of already vulnerable 
local actors.5 Post-Katrina, criminal procedure rules failed to protect 
individual rights or even ensure normalcy, while deferential doctrines 
rooted in federalism hindered provision of critical federal emergency 
assistance. 
In Part I of this Article, we present a narrative of the collapse of 
the New Orleans area criminal system after Hurricane Katrina. The 
account is based on local news coverage and a series of interviews at 
all levels of the New Orleans criminal system. We obtained first-hand 
information from police officers, state and federal judges, the district 
attorney, prosecutors, prisoners, prison officials, federal agents, and 
defense lawyers. These actors describe unforeseen devastation, poor 
planning, indifference and shock, heroic efforts, creative jerry-rigging, 
but ultimately inadequate efforts to preserve a semblance of orderly 
administration of justice. We describe how a police department was 
left alone to try to enforce order. Courts set up temporary facilities 
haphazardly (in a Greyhound bus station). Prosecutors remained 
understaffed and in disarray. Prisoners arrested for minor violations 
remained in poor conditions without hearings for upwards of six 
months. The few local judges who tried to intervene faced an 
indifferent state supreme court. While federal and state officials failed 
to intervene, volunteers conducted an ad hoc operation to identify 
thousands of prisoners and file motions for their release, but with 
 
 5. On how one defines an “emergency,” see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency 
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1042 (2004). See also Oren Gross, “Once More unto the 
Breach”: The Systemic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to 
Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 437, 438–39 (1998) (describing the term 
emergency as “open-ended” and relative to the definition of normalcy). We use the term 
“emergency” and not “natural disaster” given the significant role played in New Orleans by 
non-natural faulty construction of levees and canals and because the same concerns would be 
implicated in the event of a terrorist attack. For recent criticism of the role of federalism in 
institutional failure after Katrina, see Stephen M. Griffin, Stop Federalism Before it Kills Again: 
Reflections on Hurricane Katrina (Mar. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=894470. 
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only a skeleton crew of six defense lawyers remaining to represent 
them. 
In Part II, we turn from what happened to the roles played by 
constitutional criminal procedure and federalism during the collapse 
of the New Orleans criminal system. The aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina presents a little-examined constitutional crisis. Scholars 
typically examine the scope and role of constitutional rights during an 
emergency given a scenario of executive aggrandizement of power at 
the expense of individual rights.6 The opposite occurred after Katrina: 
abdication of responsibility at all levels of government. Local officials 
and institutions did not function and did not provide even a forum for 
constitutional rights to be heard, much less vindicated. First, existing 
criminal procedure rules remained ineffective in preventing mass 
abuses—we catalogue the Bill of Rights provisions violated—but not 
 
 6. Scholarship regarding law during emergencies has focused on executive powers during 
wartime and recently regarding the War on Terror. See, e.g., PAUL L. MURPHY, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES: 1918–1969, at 1 (1972) (“Confronted with the immediate crisis 
of modern total war . . . Congress and the President were called upon to extend their 
powers . . . .”); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
WARTIME 218 (1998) (“Without question the government’s authority to engage in conduct that 
infringes civil liberty is greatest in time of declared war . . . .”); Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1029 
(“After each successful [terrorist] attack, politicians will come up with repressive laws and 
promise greater security . . . .”); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the 
War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 28–30 (2003) (“[T]he war on terrorism has 
once again prompted calls for preventive justice . . . .”); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should 
Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1023 (2003) 
(“[D]emocratic governments must be careful not to fight terrorism with lawless means.”); Jules 
Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1397–1421 (1989) 
(“In a nuclear age dominated by two superpowers, frequent crises have been substituted for 
direct military confrontation between two great power blocs.”); Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional 
Law: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 736, 741 (1978) (“[D]uring times 
of all-out emergency, such as declared war, judges and legislators deferred to the Executive.”); 
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 605 
(2003) (“Events since September 11, 2001 have produced a new round of debate about law and 
the emergency powers of government.”); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801, 1801 (2004) (“[T]alk of leaving the Constitution 
behind . . . . was to be expected in the wake of September 11.”). While a few have studied the 
effect of wartime emergencies on local criminal justice, they again focus on the problem of 
executive overreaching and not institutional collapse. See Donald A. Dripps, Terror and 
Tolerance: Criminal Justice for the New Age of Anxiety, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 30–42 (2003) 
(examining possible transformation of criminal procedure rights during the war on terror); 
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2138 (2002) (arguing that 
the war on terrorism will affect domestic local law enforcement); William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, 
Federalism, and Police Misconduct, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 665, 674–78 (2002) (arguing 
that police misconduct may result from use of war on terror tactics in domestic law 
enforcement). 
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because they were inadequate or insufficiently flexible. Instead, with 
local courts failing to hold hearings, prosecutors not making charging 
decisions, and with a skeletal public defender’s office, procedure 
rights had no practical significance. Second, the emergency sheds light 
on how federalism and rules grounded in comity and deference to 
state and local government can undermine the very institutions they 
were designed to protect. In the initial period after the storm when 
local institutions were most disabled, federal aid would have been 
particularly crucial. Yet in the months after Katrina, statutes made it 
difficult for the federal government to provide law enforcement with 
logistical or financial assistance, while federal courts remained 
reluctant to remedy constitutional violations.7 
One reason may be the practical limitations of remedying pre-
existing structural deficiencies of local criminal justice actors. New 
Orleans, like many other localities, for years failed to secure basic 
criminal justice needs, particularly protections for the poor, 
minorities, and vulnerable communities. As a result of this persistent 
neglect, after Katrina, the system totally collapsed. For that reason, 
long-run rehabilitation may now require concerted local, state and 
federal efforts. 
In Part III, we conclude by imagining a system for the emergency 
provision of criminal justice that might begin to address the 
limitations of our existing institutions.8 Just as it failed to secure the 
levees, our government has ignored the vulnerability of criminal 
justice systems during emergencies. Predictable chaos followed from 
a lack of resources but also from a lack of coordination between 
different levels of government. Given the dangers of emergencies, 
from natural disasters to terrorist attacks, joint planning to secure 
basic legitimate functioning of criminal justice is sorely needed. The 
last time our country took a hard look at such questions was in the 
wake of urban riots in 1967, when the Presidential Kerner 
 
 7. As discussed infra Part II.B.1, the federal executive branch has been granted a raft of 
statutory emergency powers for other purposes under the Stafford Act, such as repairing 
buildings. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
5121–5206 (2000) (“[S]pecial measures, designed to assist the efforts of the affected States in 
expediting the rendering of aid, assistance, and emergency services . . . are necessary.”). In the 
criminal justice arena, little to no financial assistance has been made available. See infra notes 
182–86 and accompanying text. 
 8. For a general discussion of system-wide approaches courts adopt in criminal law, see 
Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=893552. 
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Commission suggested a range of procedures and remedies to adapt 
criminal justice institutions to domestic emergencies.9 We propose 
similar planning in states, the creation of emergency courts, and new 
collaboration regarding criminal justice emergency planning. 
Democratic legitimacy and public safety counsel sound 
administration of a criminal system during exigent circumstances. 
Longstanding fractures in one local criminal justice system made that 
impossible after Hurricane Katrina. 
I.  NEW ORLEANS CRIMINAL JUSTICE COLLAPSE 
A. The New Orleans Criminal Justice System Before Katrina 
Long before Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans criminal justice 
system was troubled by high crime, poor funding, bad management, 
and corruption. Commentator David Brooks described how the 
Hurricane “wash[ed] away the surface of society, [and] expose[d] the 
underlying power structures, the injustices, the patterns of corruption 
and the unacknowledged inequalities.”10 Perhaps this is particularly 
true with respect to local administration of criminal justice. 
The criminal justice system in the New Orleans area was more 
underfunded than typical in American cities. The district attorney’s 
office could only afford to pay prosecutors about $30,000 a year to 
start.11 Public defenders earned $29,000 a year.12 Louisiana is the only 
state that funds public defenders through the unsteady income stream 
of traffic tickets and court costs.13 In Orleans Parish, an office of thirty 
 
 9. See infra Part III.A. Urban riots in Detroit in July 1967, also resulted in prolonged 
detentions of thousands. Comment, The Administration of Justice in the Wake of the Detroit 
Civil Disorder of July 1967, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1544, 1544, 1629–30 (1968). 
 10. David Brooks, The Storm After the Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A23. Nearly 
100,000 of New Orleans’ residents had no means of transportation when it came time to 
evacuate the city. Eric Lipton, Committee Focuses on Failure to Aid New Orleans’s Infirm, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A20. 
 11. Gwen Filosa, Report on DA’s office finds major problems; Subpar prosecution rates, 
staff morale and turnover are cited, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 20, 2005, at A1. 
 12. See NICHOLAS L. CHIARKIS ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMMEDIATE AND 
LONGER-TERM NEEDS OF THE NEW ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM 8 (2006), available 
at http://www.lajusticecoalition.org/doc/DOJ-Orleans-Parish-Study.pdf. 
 13. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 n.1 (La. 1993) (discussing LA. REV. STAT. § 
15:146 (1993) (current version at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:146 (2005)), which establishes “a 
mechanism for local funding of individual districts’ indigent defender systems” in Louisiana); 
NAT’L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS’N, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUSTICE: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF TRIAL LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LOUISIANA 40 YEARS AFTER 
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public defenders handled a docket of thousands of cases a year.14 A 
decade of independent police chiefs rooted out flagrant corruption 
from the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), but officers 
remained underpaid and citizen distrust and police brutality 
complaints remained high.15 
The demographics of New Orleans contributed to problems that 
the criminal justice system faced. Issues of inequality remain 
inextricably tied to the aftermath of Katrina, where Orleans Parish’s 
pre-Hurricane population was 67 percent black, 28 percent below the 
poverty line, and 22 percent without their own transportation.16 The 
New Orleans poverty rate ranked the third highest of any major city 
in the United States.17 Polls indicated that most Americans thought 
the response to Katrina was inadequate, but two-thirds of blacks 
thought race was a factor18; rapper Kanye West announced that 
“George Bush doesn’t care about black people,”19 and President Bush 
acknowledged the disproportionate impact of the Hurricane due to a 
“legacy of inequality.”20 
 
GIDEON 24–25 (2004) (Alabama, the only other state that relies on court cost revenues, does so 
only as a small supplement to state funding.); see also infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
 14. Perlstein, supra note 4. 
 15. New Orleans police officers were among “the most poorly paid in the country.” Dan 
Baum, DELUGED: When Katrina hit, where were the police?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2006, at 50, 
52. 
 16. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ORLEANS PARISH QUICK FACTS, http://quickfacts.census. 
gov/qfd/states/22/22071.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2006). By 2004, the city had a population of 
about 450,000, of which 66 percent was African-American, 26 percent white, 3 percent Hispanic 
and 2.5 percent Asian (including a large Vietnamese community). OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG 
CONTROL POLICY, PROFILE OF DRUG INDICATORS 2 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www. 
whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/statelocal/la/lanewor.pdf. 
 17. Frederic Dimanche & Alenna Lepetic, New Orleans Tourism and Crime; A Case Study, 
38 J. TRAVEL RES. 19, 19 (1999) (examining the effect of crime and poverty on tourism in New 
Orleans); see also Christopher Drew, Courts’ Slow Recovery Begins at Train Station, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2005, at A22 (“[M]ore than one-quarter of the city’s 450,000 people liv[e] in 
poverty.”). 
 18. A Pew Research Center poll showed that many more African Americans (85 percent) 
than whites (63 percent) believed President Bush “could have done more to get relief efforts 
going quickly.” PEW RESEARCH CTR., TWO-IN-THREE CRITICAL OF BUSH’S RELIEF EFFORTS: 
HUGE RACIAL DIVIDE OVER KATRINA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 5 (2005), available at 
http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/255.pdf. 
 19. See John M. Broder, Amid Criticism of Federal Efforts, Charges of Racism Are Lodged, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A9 (quoting Mr. West and detailing several claims that race played 
a factor in the government’s response to Katrina). 
 20. See Michael A. Fletcher & Jonathan Weisman, Bush Says Spending Cuts Will Be 
Needed, Tax Increase Not Part Of His Gulf Relief Plan, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2005, at A1 
(reporting President Bush’s recognition of and vow to end “the legacy of racial discrimination 
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New Orleans’ local government was not unaware of the dangers 
of flooding and hurricane damage,21 and after a 2004 hurricane 
created traffic deadlock, Louisiana officials developed elaborate 
“contraflow” evacuation plans. However, the criminal justice system 
and its constituent parts, already struggling, remained particularly 
unprepared. The police department was never given proper supplies 
for a flood, including boats, food, and water. Its hurricane 
preparedness plan remained on a shelf and was never practiced.22 The 
court system did not create redundancies in records. The evidence 
room was in a basement. Prisons had no evacuation plans. Nor were 
the courts prepared to resume business after an emergency. 
B. The Storm 
On Friday, August 26, 2005, Hurricane Katrina changed course 
from its forecasted path, gathered enormous strength, and aimed at 
New Orleans. Mayor Ray Nagin ordered the first mandatory 
evacuation of the City’s half million citizens on Sunday morning, 
August 28, 2005.23 Buses drove thousands to the Superdome, but the 
City and State lacked an organized system to transport and shelter 
residents outside of the city.24 The storm raged Sunday night and 
Monday morning. Tens of thousands within the Superdome waited in 
the dark as part of the roof tore off. Cell phone towers and power 
 
and social inequality that has compounded poverty [in the Gulf Coast]”); see also Jack Shafer, 
Lost in the Flood: Why no mention of race or class in TV’s Katrina coverage?, SLATE, Aug. 31, 
2005, http://fray.slate.com/id/2124688/nav/tap2/gmail.com (last visited Aug. 19, 2006) (criticizing 
cable news’ lack of attention to the race and class elements of Katrina’s aftermath). 
 21. For example, in July, Senator Mary Landrieu held a press conference “emphasiz[ing] 
the importance of wetlands in the protection of New Orleans from hurricanes.” Children in life 
preservers held up a blue tarp to show what fifteen feet of water would look like after a major 
storm. Pupils go overboard to show coastal threat; Blue tarps simulate underwater Quarter, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 26, 2005, at 99. 
 22. See Baum, supra note 15, at 54 (stating that officers were never familiarized with the 
elaborate hurricane plan and few who were interviewed even knew it existed). 
 23. See Jan Moller, Revised contraflow starts off smoothly; First use of new plan relatively 
snarl-free, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 28, 2005, at A1 (reviewing the evacuation process under the 
revised “contraflow” traffic plan); Posting of Gordon Russell to TIMES-PICAYUNE Breaking 
News Weblog, http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-
Picayune/archives/2005_08.html (Aug. 28, 2005) (last visited Aug. 21, 2006) (detailing Mayor 
Nagin’s evacuation orders). During Katrina, a record of up to one million people evacuated in 
the two days before the storm. Pleading for Help; Bush Vows More Troops; Exodus Continues, 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 1, 2005, at A-1. 
 24. See Bruce Nolan, Katrina Takes Aim, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 28, 2005, at A1 
(reporting the city’s plans to bus residents to the Superdome). 
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lines fell, cutting off electricity and telephone communication for 
hundreds of miles.25 By morning, however, city officials announced 
that Katrina had inflicted serious wind damage but had largely spared 
New Orleans.26 What Katrina’s turn spared, poorly designed levees 
destroyed. On Monday, several canal levees, constructed by the Army 
Corps of Engineers with design flaws, broke, inundating 80 percent of 
the city.27 The waters rose past the ceilings of homes, forcing families 
to cut through their roofs to breathe. Many of the weak, the elderly, 
the sick, and the handicapped who remained did not survive.28 The 
death toll in three states totaled 1,600, the vast majority from the New 
Orleans area.29 
C. Abandoned Prisoners 
We begin with the fate of Orleans Parish Prison (OPP), the city 
jail big enough to be a “city within the city” and the seventh-largest 
jail in the country.30 Nearly eight thousand prisoners were housed in 
OPP during Hurricane Katrina, evacuated from the New Orleans 
area in the next week, and then eventually transferred to thirty-four 
facilities scattered across Louisiana.31 Of the thousands “lost in the 
system” for months afterwards, most were indigent minorities, and 
 
 25. See Marc Caputo et al., Hurricane Katrina Killed At Least Five More People, Leveled 
Numerous Building and Drove Hundreds to Their Rooftops to Escape Floods, MIAMI HERALD, 
Aug. 30, 2005, at 1A (detailing the destruction in the aftermath of Katrina). 
 26. See Anonymous posting, Scenes From a Broken City, to TIMES-PICAYUNE Breaking 
News Weblog, http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-
Picayune/archives/2005_08.html (Aug. 28, 2005, 22:30 CST) (last visited Aug. 21, 2006) 
(detailing Katrina’s destruction). 
 27. See Bob Marshall et al., Report: Flood policy flawed, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 2, 2006, at 
A1 (stating that after an eight month study, the Army Corps of Engineers admitted that the 
New Orleans hurricane protection system was “a system in name only”). 
 28. See Shaila Dewan & Janet Roberts, Louisiana’s Deadly Storm Took Strong as Well as 
the Helpless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at A1 (analyzing Katrina’s death toll). 
 29. See id. (“[M]ore than 1,400 victims from along the Gulf Coast have been 
counted . . . .”); Gwen Filosa, Storm victim’s body is found in Mid-City home; As death toll rises, 
search teams continue efforts to find missing, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 28, 2006, at B1 (reporting 
that the Louisiana death toll is at 1577 with around 300 people still missing); Sean Reilly, 
Katrina medical response was chaos, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 29, 2006, at A1. 
 30. See Michael Perlstein, Prison became island of fear; Inmates and guards were in it 
together, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 23, 2005, at A1; Henry Weinstein, 2,500 Arrested Before 
Katrina Are Still in Limbo, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, at A38 (“[A]bout 8,500 people being held 
in the New Orleans jails were relocated.”); Interview with Marlin Gusman, Sheriff of Orleans 
Parish, La., in New Orleans, La. (Mar. 13, 2006). 
 31. Paul Purpura, Inmates ordered released after months of waiting, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 
23, 2005, at B3. 
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some had already served longer while waiting for trial than they 
would have if actually convicted. Few received a hearing or met with 
counsel, and thousands remained in detention from months to a 
year.32 
Orleans Parish Sheriff Marlin Gusman did not evacuate the 
inmates before the storm, stating that he could never have convinced 
other sheriffs to house his thousands of inmates.33 Instead the prison 
conducted some very last minute preparation and planned on 
“vertical evacuation” to higher floors if the city flooded.34 
Most of the inmates spending the storm in OPP were arrested for 
minor offenses like criminal trespass, public drunkenness, failure to 
pay traffic tickets, or disorderly conduct; many had not yet been 
brought before a judge or charged, some had almost finished serving 
their sentences, and others would only have been subject to a ticket.35 
For example, one inmate was charged for reading tarot cards without 
a permit and was to have been released prior to August 29.36 The 
prison also, however, housed hundreds of defendants charged with 
rape and murder.37 
The large concrete buildings survived the storm itself well, but 
not the levee break. Waters rose quickly on Monday night and ruined 
the emergency generators.38 The prison lost lights and air circulation 
 
 32. Id.; Interview with Terry Alarcon, Judge, Orleans Parish Criminal Dist. Ct., in New 
Orleans, La. (Mar. 13, 2006); ACLU REPORT, supra note 3. 
 33. Interview with Marlin Gusman, supra note 30. For criticism of Sheriff Gusman’s 
decision see ACLU REPORT, supra note 3, at 19–27. The ACLU conducted an extensive 
investigation of the conditions of OPP, interviewing more than a thousand prisoners. 
 34. Interview with Renee Lapeyrolerie, Spokesperson for New Orleans Criminal Sheriff 
Marlin Gusman, in New Orleans, La. (Dec. 12, 2005); see also ACLU REPORT, supra note 3, at 
19–27 (criticizing the inadequacies of the sheriff’s hurricane preparedness). 
 35. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, New Orleans: Prisoners Abandoned to 
Floodwaters (Sept. 22, 2005), available at http://hrw.org/English/docs/2005/09/22/usdom11771. 
htm. 
 36. Democracy Now: After the Hurricane: Where Have All the Prisoners Gone? More than 
500 from New Orleans Jail Still Unaccounted For (Democracy Now radio broadcast Sept. 27, 
2005) [hereinafter Democracy Now] (transcript available at http://www.democracynow.org/ 
article.pl?sid=05/09/27/1433256#transcript). 
 37. See Phyllis Mann, Hurricane Relief Aid, ADVOCATE (La. Ass’n of Criminal Def. 
Lawyers, Baton Rouge, La.), Fall 2005, at 3, 3, available at 
www.lacdl.org/Newsletters/LACDLFall2005.pdf (noting the crimes of various jail residents). 
 38. Interview with Marlin Gusman, supra note 30. While the generators were located safely 
above the waters, the fuel was on the first floor. Id.; see also Perlstein, supra note 30 (noting that 
the jail was without power). 
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(in ninety-degree weather); soon the sewage backed up as well.39 The 
rising water filled the ground floor cells with chest-deep water, and 
transformed the jail into an “island of fear and frustration.”40 
Guards, required to stay during the storm, had brought their 
families with them.41 Worried about their own children, they were 
“not doing quite so much worrying about the safety of the people 
locked inside the cells.”42 Electronic cells could not be opened and 
food could not be safely distributed.43 Guards brought inmates to 
higher floors, where they were crowded in with other prisoners.44 
“[T]he man who failed to pay his traffic ticket was shoulder to 
shoulder with the man serving 20 years for manslaughter. They were 
afraid of each other; they were afraid of dying; they were afraid no 
one would ever come back for them.”45 
Many deputies simply deserted; some deputies that remained 
attempted to use force to keep prisoners in their flooded cells, though 
some helped them break windows, because “[i]f you didn’t break the 
windows, you didn’t breathe.”46 Prisoners signaled for help by setting 
fire to blankets and shirts and hanging signs outside the windows 
reading “We Need Help,” “Help Us,” and “One Man Down.”47 
Despite early reports of deaths, all of the prisoners have been 
accounted for.48 Several escaped, jumping over razor wire fences and 
swimming through the floodwaters.49 
 
 39. Perlstein, supra note 30. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Mann, supra note 37, at 3. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 4. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Perlstein, supra note 30. 
 47. Id.; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, supra note 35. 
 48. Interview with Renee Lapeyrolerie, supra note 34. 
 49. See Michael Perlstein, Inmate says jail escape was ‘survival’; Fear of new charges keeps 
him on the lam, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 23, 2005, at B1 (stating that an inmate wanted on 
fugitive charges called the reporter from an undisclosed location to describe the necessity of his 
decision to escape). Fourteen warrants were later issued for fugitives. Id. Some of these were 
later located in custody, but eight had actually escaped and were recovered. Interview with 
Marlin Gusman, supra note 30; see also Michael Perlstein, Fourteen escaped prison in Katrina 
chaos, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 19, 2005, at A1 (detailing efforts to account for fourteen inmates 
for whom fugitive arrest warrants were issued after Katrina). One of the fugitives was located 
after he applied for FEMA benefits in his own name. Interview with Marlin Gusman, supra note 
30. 
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The next day, the Louisiana Department of Corrections arrived 
with boats to carry prisoners to an elevated overpass on the nearby 
interstate (where New Orleans residents rescued from their homes 
also awaited transportation).50 Deputies parked buses as close as 
floodwaters allowed, and ferried prisoners day and night to other jails 
around the state.51 
Most prisoners were brought to a staging area for processing, an 
outdoor football field at the Elayn Hunt Correctional Facility in St. 
Gabriel, Louisiana.52 The numbers at Hunt grew so large that guards 
did not feel safe patrolling inside the gated field and retreated beyond 
the fences.53 An inmate described, “[y]ou had to sleep on the wet 
grass. They didn’t have anywhere we could urinate or defecate . . . we 
didn’t have hot food. We didn’t have cold water. In fact, they come 
once a day and throw peanut butter sandwiches over the gate. They 
wouldn’t even come in the gate.”54 Men and women charged with 
misdemeanors were mixed together with inmates facing felony and 
capital murder charges, and violence resulted.55 
New Orleans judges attempted to create makeshift court 
hearings at Hunt, but could not meaningfully conduct hearings in the 
absence of the inmates themselves (who were in a jumble), or their 
lawyers (who were evacuated) or the public (who were not allowed 
into the state prison).56 Although a few public defenders attended 
these hearings, some private defense lawyers were turned away at the 
gates of Hunt.57 
 
 50. See Laura Maggi, Roundup of buses for storm bungled, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 6, 2005, 
at A1 (noting that a number of people had gathered on Interstate 10 after the storm); Press 
Release, Human Rights Watch, supra note 35 (criticizing the prison’s lack of an evacuation 
plan); Telephone Interview with Phyllis Mann, Past President, La. Ass’n of Criminal Def. 
Lawyers (Jan. 5, 2006); Interview with Burl Cain, Warden, La. State Penitentiary, in Angola, La. 
(Jan. 23, 2006). Thousands of other citizens also were left to wait on the interstate for rescue, 
including Professor Tetlow’s family. 
 51. Interview with Burl Cain, supra note 50. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Democracy Now, supra note 36. 
 55. Id.; Posting of Gwen Filosa, New Detention Center Opened, to TIMES-PICAYUNE 
Breaking News Weblog, http://www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_ 
Times-Picayune/archives/2005_09_03.html (Sept. 3, 2005) (last visited Aug. 21, 2006); Interview 
with Burl Cain, supra note 50; ACLU REPORT, supra note 3, at 74–76. 
 56. See Susan Finch, New Orleans courts carry on in Gonzales and Baton Rouge, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Oct. 14, 2005, at B1 (reporting that judges were taking turns presiding at bond 
hearings at Hunt); Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50. 
 57. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50. 
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The Department of Corrections then housed inmates in prisons 
and parish jails around the state.58 More than a thousand inmates, 
including several hundred women, were moved to Angola, the state’s 
maximum-security men’s prison.59 While grateful to have escaped the 
hell of Orleans Parish Prison, evacuated prisoners faced a new 
purgatory.60 For days and sometimes weeks, defendants were not 
given access to telephones to find out whether their families had 
survived the storm.61 Few would see lawyers. Many would end up 
serving more than six months, far more than their sentences, or for 
those with pending charges, more than their sentences could have 
been if convicted.62 
D. Emergency Law Enforcement 
When the levees broke, the citizens outside of the jail walls were 
left to their own devices for law enforcement as police officers 
struggled to patrol and rescue with flooded vehicles and dead radios.63 
“To those left in the city, it felt as if government at all levels had 
vanished, as if not only New Orleans but the nation itself had 
disappeared.”64 The NOPD lacked leadership. Police Chief Eddie 
Compass was nowhere to be found in the first few days after the 
 
 58. Interview with Burl Cain, supra note 50. 
 59. See Gwen Filosa, Inmates fighting for their freedom, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 15, 2005, at 
B1 (noting that ninety-four women moved from New Orleans to Angola had filed a suit seeking 
their release); Penny Brown Roberts, 16 Female Prisoners Released from Angola, ADVOCATE 
(Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 23, 2005, at 11-A (stating that several women who were moved from 
New Orleans prisons to Angola after Katrina were released following an order from a federal 
judge). Angola’s population increased by 40 percent. John Corley et al., Worst case scenario: 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita change life as we know it, ANGOLITE, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 17, 18 
(THE ANGOLITE is the award-winning magazine published by inmates at Angola Prison). 
 60. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50; Interview with Burl Cain, supra note 50. 
Inmates brought to facilities other than Angola continued to face brutal treatment, including 
racial epithets and beatings from guards. ACLU REPORT, supra note 3, at 82–85. The Louisiana 
Department of Corrections housed inmates at a private jail facility in Jena, Louisiana, which 
had previously been closed because of brutality allegations. Inmates reported particularly 
egregious violence there. Id. 
 61. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50; Interview with Nick Trenticosta, Criminal 
Defense Attorney, in New Orleans, La. (Dec. 12, 2005). Angola Penitentiary, where inmates 
reported far better treatment, was an exception. ACLU REPORT, supra note 3, at 85. 
 62. Interview with Nick Trenticosta, supra note 61. 
 63. See Michael Perlstein & Trymaine Lee, The Good and the Bad, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 
18, 2005, at A1 (detailing the obstacles the police force faced in providing law enforcement after 
Katrina). 
 64. Baum, supra note 15, at 58. 
04__GARRETT_TETLOW.DOC 11/14/2006  8:38 AM 
140 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:127 
storm and soon resigned citing personal problems.65 Among the rank 
and file, though most officers struggled bravely to do their jobs under 
impossible circumstances, more than two hundred officers left under 
the pressure, and two officers killed themselves.66 During the storm, 
flying debris knocked out police radios and thus the chain of 
command; groups of officers functioned under their own orders.67 
District commanders learned how to “beg, borrow and acquire” to 
feed their officers, getting socks, underwear and food for them (with 
permission) from a Wal-Mart.68 Most police stations and vehicles 
flooded, so officers commandeered boats and siphoned gas from 
parked cars.69 They cleared blocked streets with chainsaws and 
bulldozers, and evacuated patients from hospitals.70 They managed to 
rescue thousands, with little outside assistance.71 They slept in police 
stations or in requisitioned buildings until receiving housing on a 
cruise ship named “Ecstasy.”72 
While the NOPD remained in disarray, local officials and the 
national media reported violence, murders, and rapes (including of 
babies).73 The level of violence in pre-Katrina New Orleans made it 
 
 65. See id. at 55, 59 (noting that Compass was nearly invisible during the first three days of 
the crisis). 
 66. Perlstein & Lee, supra note 63, at A1. Five days after the storm, Officer Lawrence 
Celestine cried that he did not know whether his family was alive and felt betrayed by officers 
who abandoned them; a few hours later, he shot himself dead in front of fellow officers. See 
Telephone Interview with Ray Connor, Agent, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF), and former New Orleans Police Officer (Dec. 20, 2005) (Connor spoke to 
Celestine shortly before his suicide); see also Trymaine Lee, District struggles to come to terms 
with officer’s suicide, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 18, 2005, at A28 (detailing the suicide of Officer 
Celestine). The next day, police spokesman Officer Paul Accardo killed himself. See Interview 
with Ray Connor, supra. 
 67. Perlstein & Lee, supra note 63. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Baum, supra note 15, at 54–55; Michael Perlstein, Undercover officers embark on new 
mission: search and rescue, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 18, 2005, at A1. 
 70. Michael Perlstein, Uptown heroics overshadowed by number of officers gone AWOL, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 18, 2005, at A1. 
 71. See Baum, supra note 15, at 57 (describing the police force’s struggle to rescue storm 
victims with little outside help); Perlstein & Lee, supra note 63 (noting the resourcefulness of 
the police in helping citizens after the storm). 
 72. Baum, supra note 15, at 62; Trymaine Lee, After securing Algiers, officers throw a 
lifeline to fellow cops, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 18, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Lee, Officers throw a 
lifeline]; Trymaine Lee, Stranded but still standing, officers rescue 9th Ward neighbors, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Dec. 18, 2005, at A1; Walt Philbin, Housing sorely needed, cops say; Cruise ship 
living is about to sail away, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 16, 2006, at A1. 
 73. After the Flood, The Hard Truths: Sharks in Canal Street? Snipers on Rooftops? Terror 
in the Superdome?, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 15, 2005, at 28 [hereinafter After the Flood]. 
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easier for local public officials and citizens to believe these rumors 
and to pass them on,74 but in total, only four murders have been 
confirmed during the week after Katrina, a typical week in a city that 
anticipated more than 200 homicides in 2005.75 Still, fear of violence 
was significant, as it delayed help to those waiting on roofs.76 
Looting occurred, particularly in downtown stores, making 
additional law enforcement and arrests necessary under emergency 
conditions.77 The day after the storm, looters at a gas station shot a 
police officer in the head.78 Officers shot eleven people during the 
week after the storm; four died.79 In the meantime, civilians “tried to 
weave their own safety net.”80 Several law enforcement witnesses 
reported that citizens beat up a man after he attempted a sexual 
assault of a young girl.81 Many began carrying firearms.82 Residents of 
one of the city’s most exclusive gated communities hired armed 
Israeli mercenaries to guard their mansions.83 Citizens also created 
 
 74. See Michael Lewis, Wading Toward Home, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005 (Magazine), at 44 
(detailing some of the rumors and fears floating around New Orleans after the storm); Robert 
Pierre & Ann Gerhart, News of Pandemonium May Have Slowed Aid, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 
2005, at A8 (reporting that some officials believe that exaggerations of mayhem slowed the 
response to the disaster). 
 75. See Brian Thevenot & Gordon Russell, RAPE. MURDER. GUNFIGHTS., TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Sept. 26, 2005, at A1 (noting that there were no murders at the Superdome, and one 
at the Convention Center, which lacked meaningful security). 
 76. Id.; Pierre & Gerhart, supra note 74; see also After the Flood, supra note 73 (“If the 
dome and the Convention Centre had harboured large numbers of middle-class white people, it 
would not have been a fertile ground for his kind of rumour-mongering.” (quoting James 
Amoss, Rita’s Aftermath; Katrina Takes Toll on Truth, News Accuracy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2005, at A16)). 
 77. See Jed Horne, Help Us, Please; After the disaster, chaos and lawlessness rule the streets, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 2, 2005, at A1 (“The focused police work had not been enough to 
shield all French Quarter shops from the looters . . . .”). 
 78. Lee, Officers throw a lifeline, supra note 72. 
 79. See Perlstein & Lee, supra note 63 (“[T]he department also is reviewing . . . police 
shootings in which four people were killed and seven injured . . . .”). 
 80. Baum, supra note 15, at 59. 
 81. Thevenot & Russell, supra note 75. 
 82. See Baum, supra note 15, at 59–60 (relating that nearly every white New Orleanian 
Baum met was armed; he feared racial violence). Weapon sales in surrounding areas soared. 
See, e.g., Paul Rioux, Firearm sales are booming since Katrina; Chaos after storm has fueled fears, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 19, 2006, at B1. 
 83. See Jamie Wilson, Mercenaries Guard Homes of the Rich in New Orleans, GUARDIAN 
(London), Sept. 12, 2005, at 22 (“Hundreds of mercenaries have descended on New Orleans to 
guard the property of the city’s millionaires from looters.”). 
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their own rescue efforts, commandeering boats and vehicles to rescue 
people from roofs.84 
By the Thursday after the storm, federal law enforcement agents 
(especially from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)) came 
to assist the NOPD patrol.85 Agents brought crucial supplies, 
including ammunition and law enforcement t-shirts for officers 
without uniforms.86 
A remarkable political battle between the governor of Louisiana 
and President Bush delayed by a week the arrival of federal military 
troops for rescue operations and to establish order.87 Most of the 
Louisiana National Guard was serving in Iraq, due back weeks after 
Hurricane Katrina hit.88 The day the storm hit, Governor Blanco 
asked President Bush for Guard assistance.89 The White House 
informed Blanco that it would not send troops unless she would agree 
to the federalization of her National Guard.90 Commanders of the 
Louisiana National Guard and other state guards advised Blanco not 
to agree because the Guard would then be prohibited by the Posse 
 
 84. See Baum, supra note 15, at 59 (“A casting director and a tax attorney . . . 
commandeered a waterskiing boat to . . . rescue people from roofs and attics.”). A local 
businessman used a fire truck (which he owned for Mardi Gras parading purposes) to ferry 
paramedics around Lakeview. Interview with Scott Sewell, Owner of Sewell Cadillac, in New 
Orleans, La. (Nov. 2, 2005). 
 85. Interview with anonymous DEA agent (Jan. 10, 2006); Telephone Interview with 
Daniel Hebert, Agent, ATF, in New Orleans, La. (Jan. 12, 2006). Indeed, agents sometimes 
ignored orders to focus on law enforcement and instead rescued people with their boats. Id. 
 86. Interview with anonymous DEA agent, supra note 85; Interview with Charles Smith, 
Agent, ATF, in New Orleans, La. (Oct. 24, 2005). 
 87. See Robert Travis Scott, Politics delayed troop dispatch to N.O.; Blanco resisted Bush 
leadership proposal, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 11, 2005, at A1 (“[T]he question for many people is 
why it took President Bush five days to order the 82nd [Army Airborne] on the ground . . . . 
[D]ocuments show that the White House delayed its decision to deploy federal troops while it 
pressured . . . Blanco to accept the president’s hand-picked commander . . . .”); Interview with 
Robert Mann, Commc’ns Dir. for Governor Blanco, in Baton Rouge, La. (Nov. 30, 2005). In 
contrast, other governors sent National Guard members within days, creating the largest 
coordinated, multi-state mobilization of guardsmen in U.S. history. Id. The Coast Guard, 
already stationed locally, became the most effective rescue unit, saving more than thirty-three 
thousand with their fleet of boats and helicopters. Paul Purpura, Coast Guard stands up well to 
its biggest task: Unprecedented rescues draw praise, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 2, 2005, at A1. 
 88. Scott, supra note 87; see Scott Shane & Thom Shanker, When Storm Hit, National 
Guard Was Deluged Too, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at A1 (“Guard commanders . . . blame in 
part . . . the deployment to Iraq of 3,200 Louisiana guardsmen.”). 
 89. See Scott, supra note 87 (“On the day Katrina hit, Blanco told the president by phone, 
‘We need everything you’ve got,’ according to the governor’s overview.”). 
 90. Id. 
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Comitatus Act91 from conducting law enforcement, and because the 
governor would lose all control over the operation.92 Blanco refused 
the request for federalization, and a few minutes later President Bush 
announced anyway that he would send federal troops.93 
Those troops helped rescue people who remained trapped on 
their roofs after five days, and began recovering bodies of those who 
had perished in the storm and its aftermath. Soldiers provided less 
help with law enforcement. People soon learned that the soldiers 
carried unloaded rifles.94 Prohibited by the Posse Comitatus from 
making arrests, soldiers had no law enforcement training and 
sometimes, together with FEMA, merely hindered local law 
enforcement.95 
After the floodwaters receded, police officers, federal agents, 
and troops patrolled the city and settled into a posture of undeclared 
martial law.96 On Tuesday, September 6, the Mayor ordered a 
mandatory evacuation of remaining citizens.97 Military checkpoints 
stopped every passing car at major intersections checking for 
 
 91. See Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000) (prohibiting the use of armed forces 
to “execute the laws”). 
 92. See Scott supra note 87 (“Documents and interviews show that Blanco wanted to avoid 
conceding her authority . . . .”). The governor also wondered whether the White House was 
seeking political advantage by seizing control of the Guard. Sources within the White House 
indicated that they planned to blame Blanco for the delay in federal troops because she refused 
to accede to the president’s ultimatum about federalizing the Guard. Id. 
 93. See Manuel Roig-Franzia & Spencer Hsu, Many Evacuated, but Thousands Still 
Waiting; White House Shifts Blame to State and Local Officials, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at 
A1 (“President Bush authorized the dispatch of 7,200 active-duty ground troops . . . . Shortly 
before midnight Friday, the Bush administration . . . [had] ask[ed] her [Governor Blanco] to 
request a federal takeover . . . .”). 
 94. See Interview with Daniel Hebert, supra note 85. 
 95. See Eric Lipton et al., Storm and Crisis: Government Assistance; Breakdowns Marked 
Path From Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 1.1 (“[T]he federal government 
failed . . . to face domestic threats as a unified, seamless force. Instead, the crisis in New Orleans 
deepened because of . . . hesitant federal officials and besieged local authorities . . . .”). 
Regarding Posse Comitatus, see infra notes 217–20. The military is largely untrained in police 
work. “They were good people, but a lot of them were used to using computer guided rockets to 
blow things up from miles away.” Interview with anonymous DEA agent, supra note 85. 
 96. See Baum, supra note 15, at 60 (“The phrase on the lips of the guest enforcers was 
‘martial law.’”). Other local law enforcement officers came from around the country to help. In 
particular, because New Orleans departments were among the first responders after September 
11, New York’s departments were eager to reciprocate. See Al Baker, In New Orleans, Pausing 
to Remember, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at B4 (“The team’s work is not only a tangible way to 
pay back the New Orleans Fire Department, which rushed some of its firefighters to New York 
City four years ago, but a benchmark for how far the New York department has come . . . .”). 
 97. Baum, supra note 15, at 60. 
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identification and the permission slips required to be in the city.98 The 
City reopened to citizens on September 30,99 but a nighttime curfew 
remained in place through December. Until late February, Louisiana 
National Guardsmen patrolled New Orleans in humvees, with M-16s 
and flack-jackets.100 Meanwhile, the evacuation resulted in a 
precipitous drop in the crime rate in New Orleans for the next six 
months.101 
E. “Camp Greyhound”: Jerry-Rigging a Judicial System 
Immediately after the storm, the NOPD realized they could not 
make arrests without a jail, so officers simply released the people they 
apprehended.102 Within a week, however, the state Department of 
Corrections set up a temporary jail in a Greyhound bus station and 
train terminal, using electrical power from a locomotive.103 Inmate 
“trustees” from Angola prison built the jail out of chain-link fences 
with a bus canopy for a roof; each cell contained a portable toilet and 
inmates slept on the ground.104 
 
 98. Residents became creative about manufacturing permission slips or official 
identifications. See Day to Day: Katie Lasky Discusses Going Home, With or Without 
Permission (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 16, 2005). 
 99. See Bruce Hamilton, Hobbled city opens doors to some; There won’t be much to eat, 
drink or do, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 30, 2005, at Hurricane Katrina: Special Coverage 
(“[R]esidents return to New Orleans today, one month after Hurricane Katrina . . . . Residents 
who live in the reopened zip codes can enter the city at 8 a.m.”). 
 100. See Guard stands down from hurricane duty, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 19, 2006, at A18 
(“The last of the Louisiana National Guard troops mobilized for Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita . . . were released from active duty in late February . . . .”). 
 101. See Adam Nossiter, New Orleans Crime Swept Away, With Most of the People, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at A18 (“New Orleans, the nation’s most dangerous city, has suddenly 
become perhaps its safest, and what had easily been the country’s murder capital now has a 
murder rate of exactly zero.”). New Orleans crime may have shifted elsewhere. See Trymaine 
Lee, Evacuee-packed Houston sees jump in crime; 9 of 122 killings tied to people from N.O., 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 2, 2006, at B1 (“[O]fficials [in Houston] say the city has found itself 
under the gun, with an escalating murder rate . . . .”). 
 102. See Baum, supra note 15, at 57 (“One captain told me that when his officers caught 
looters they photographed them with their booty and turned them loose, hoping to arrest them 
later on a warrant.”). 
 103. Gwen Filosa, Looting suspects stationed at Greyhound terminal, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 
9, 2005, at A8; see also Reuters, Bus Line Upset With ‘Camp Greyhound’ Jail Name, 
MSNBC.COM, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9324415 (last visited Aug. 21, 2005) 
(“The Greyhound bus station in New Orleans was converted into a makeshift jail . . . .”). 
 104. See Drew, supra note 17 (“Inmates are held in chain-link pens . . . under a canopy 
where the buses once pulled up. Each cell has a portable toilet, like those at construction 
sites.”). Warden Cain turned over cash kept in Greyhound’s safe to the company, using his 
trustees to crack the safe. Interview with Burl Cain, supra note 50. 
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Though crime rates fell with the population evacuated, between 
August 30 and September 8, 2005, more than two hundred arrests 
were made.105 Most of those, 178, were for looting; 26 for possession 
of stolen vehicles; 20 for resisting arrest; 14 for theft; and 9 for 
attempted murder.106 A few were arrested for misdemeanors such as 
disturbing the peace.107 According to the warden, the first prisoner 
housed there “drove up in a stolen Enterprise rental car to buy a bus 
ticket.”108 Assistant District Attorneys for Orleans Parish and 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys manned a desk in the lobby of the bus 
station, working from the “Taste of New Orleans Gift Shop,”109 and a 
magistrate held bond hearings.110 
For its two-month life, the makeshift criminal court facility did 
not follow rules of open proceedings, instead “barring family and 
friends and allowing only arrestees and counsel in the courtroom.”111 
Most days, inmates were bused to true bond hearings in state or 
federal court outside of New Orleans.112 Local judges then set bonds 
too high for many indigent defendants to pay, rather than release 
defendants back into the city or provide transportation to where their 
families had evacuated. Large numbers of prisoners simply accepted 
guilty pleas for misdemeanors and were then released.113 
F. The Judicial Response 
After the storm, the court system first faced the major logistical 
problems of lacking a physical plant and communications. Judges, 
 
 105. See Filosa, supra note 103 (“In the past week, 155 came from the Jefferson Parish 
Sheriff’s Office; 39 were nabbed by Kenner police. New Orleans brought in 17 . . . .”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. (“Orleans Parish District Attorney Eddie Jordan’s office has a designated work 
space, as does U.S. Attorney Jim Letten’s.”); Drew, supra note 17 (“The prosecutor hustles up 
from his office—aka the Taste of New Orleans gift shop . . . .”). 
 110. See Finch, supra note 56 (“Magistrate Gerard Hansen has relocated to the Union 
Passenger Terminal, which has served as a makeshift criminal justice center . . . .”). 
 111. Press Release, ACLU of La., Orleans Parish Deputy Attempts to Boot ACLU Staff 
Attorney from New Orleans Criminal Court Room; ACLU Calls for Open, Public Court 
Proceedings (Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://www.laaclu.org/News/2005/ 
Oct12OPPProceedings.htm; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 
(1980) (“Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be 
open to the public.”). 
 112. Id.; Telephone Interview with Greg Kennedy, Assistant U.S. Attorney, E. Dist. of La. 
(Jan. 15, 2006). 
 113. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50. 
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prosecutors, defense attorneys and their staffs evacuated over a 
weekend, without any opportunity to discuss logistics, and scattered 
over several states.114 These officials became unreachable for weeks.115 
The court complex flooded, damaging police headquarters, public 
defender, district attorney, and clerk of court offices, and coroner and 
evidence rooms.116 The Louisiana Supreme Court building (also 
housing the intermediate court of appeal) was located in New 
Orleans, and although it did not flood, the city itself was inaccessible 
for a month. The federal district court and U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit were forced to relocate, to Baton Rouge and 
Houston, respectively.117 
The state criminal court now faced problems that included 
suspended funding for prosecutors and public defenders, prisoners 
scattered around the state,118 about half of the private defense bar 
gone,119 a flooded evidence room,120 no jury pool,121 and a docket of 
thousands of pending cases.122 New Orleans criminal court judges took 
turns sitting at Hunt and the Greyhound jail until December when 
they borrowed courtrooms in the federal courthouse.123 Their own 
courthouse did not reopen until June 1, 2006.124 
 
 114. See Interview with Judge Alarcon, supra note 32. 
 115. See Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50. 
 116. See, e.g., Susan Finch, Orleans judge holds court in Gonzales, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 
26, 2005, at A2 (“Katrina’s floodwaters invaded most of the first floor of [Orleans Parish district 
attorney’s] office building . . . [with] reports of flooding in some of the evidence rooms . . . .”). 
 117. See Pamela MacLean, A Tale of Disaster and Two Courts; U.S. Courts Open, La. 
Courts Struggle, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 7, 2005, at 1 (“[J]udges in U.S. District Court in New Orleans 
have returned to the old court . . . . [T]he 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals . . . [has a] new 
temporary headquarters in Houston.”). Chief Judge Ginger Berrigan of the federal district court 
suspended speedy trial deadlines for three months, modeling her order after a September 11, 
2001, order issued by the Southern District of New York; ultimately, federal court reopened 
more quickly than that. See Interview with Helen G. Berrigan, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for 
the E. Dist. of La., in New Orleans, La. (Dec. 11, 2005). 
 118. See Michael Perlstein, Charge suspects or free them, DA urged, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 
9, 2005, at A1 (“[I]nmates . . . remain spread among various state prisons . . . .”). 
 119. MacLean, supra note 117 (noting that half of the defense bar is gone). 
 120. See Perlstein, supra note 118 (“The police evidence room . . . [was] underwater for 
several days.”). 
 121. Finch, supra note 56 (reporting that the jury pool had scattered around the country). 
 122. Perlstein, supra note 118. 
 123. See Interview with Judge Alarcon, supra note 32; Interview with Chief Judge Berrigan, 
supra note 117. 
 124. Gwen Filosa, Court set to reopen today; Trials resume Monday at Tulane and Broad, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 1, 2006, at B1. 
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The district attorney’s office lost much of its funding when the 
tax base of the city collapsed, and laid off dozens of staff, including all 
investigators, and could not pay its phone bill.125 For months, 
prosecutors worked from home and at three tables in a downtown 
hotel.126 From December 2005 until May 2006, the office moved into a 
nightclub where lawyers worked at tables under disco balls.127 
Witnesses had scattered around the country and the evidence vault, in 
a basement, was underwater for several days.128 
The public defender’s office faced still greater adversity, 
eventually laying off twenty-five of its thirty-five attorneys for budget 
reasons.129 The funding for the office, which had recently been 
criticized by the state Supreme Court as constitutionally inadequate,130 
was based primarily on traffic tickets.131 With the population 
evacuated, “‘[n]o tickets, no money.’”132 Accordingly, the few public 
defenders still on the job have struggled to represent those arrested 
post-Katrina, and have not even attempted to meet with the 
thousands detained from before Katrina.133 
In the absence of courthouses, venue and local jury pools, the 
state supreme court declared a “court holiday” until October 25.134 It 
 
 125. See Associated Press, Katrina Still Threatens 3,000 New Orleans Court Cases, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 30, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news.nation.2005-10-30-katrina-courts_x.htm 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2006) (reporting that the D.A.’s phone shut off when the phone bill was 
not paid); Susan Finch, Civil, criminal courts face funding crisis; Orleans DA cuts nonessential 
staff, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 8, 2005, at B4 (contending that the city is responsible for one-third 
of the D.A. budget, and not paying); Susan Finch, supra note 116 (reporting that the district 
attorney laid off fifty-four employees after receiving no money from city); Interview with Eddie 
Jordan, District Attorney of Orleans Parish, in New Orleans, La. (Dec. 12, 2005). 
 126. See Frank Donze, Study says city should weigh bankruptcy, Municipal government, 
schools described as near insolvency, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 6, 2006, at A1; Interview with 
Eddie Jordan, supra note 125; Filosa, supra note 124. 
 127. See Interview with Eddie Jordan, supra note 125. 
 128. Id.; Perlstein, supra note 118. While juries might accept a rusty gun or moldy plank as 
evidence, the clerk of court noted that “[c]ocaine doesn’t hold up very well in water.” Id. 
 129. Paul Purpura, Cupboard bare for poor’s legal aid, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 2, 2005, at 
B1. 
 130. See State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 336–39 (La. 2005) (criticizing the deficiencies in 
public defender funding, but requiring proof of insufficiency in individual cases). 
 131. See MacLean, supra note 117 (“Each judicial district pays its own [defenders] through 
collection of court costs, usually traffic tickets.”); Interview with Nick Trenticosta, supra note 
61. 
 132. MacLean, supra note 117 (quoting Phyllis Mann, past president of the Louisiana 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). 
 133. See Perlstein, supra note 118. 
 134. Id. 
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did nothing else to assist the court system. On September 6, Governor 
Kathleen Blanco issued an executive order declaring that because 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita had disrupted communications, rendered 
courthouses inoperable, and caused “destruction and disruption of 
services and infrastructure to our system of justice,” all deadlines in 
legal proceedings would be suspended for thirty days.135 
Due to this institutional collapse, of the approximately 8,000 
inmates transferred from New Orleans throughout the state of 
Louisiana, thousands served illegal sentences, thousands were 
released only after six months, and thousands still faced charges but 
have yet to see a lawyer in more than six months, and many still had 
not seen a lawyer a year after Katrina struck.136  
Normally prisoners arrested for misdemeanors, as most of the 
8,000 were, would have been released after forty-five days, “unless 
they had an outstanding warrant or a probation or parole hold,” but 
“without paperwork, a judge, a prosecutor and a defense lawyer,” no 
such hearings were held after the aborted effort at Hunt.137 Thus, 
these prisoners were not released, received no hearing, and had not 
seen a lawyer, much less a judge, for many months after the storm. 
A handful of criminal defense lawyers did respond immediately 
after the storm. Phyllis Mann, a former president of the Louisiana 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, heard that prisoners from 
the New Orleans area were landing in jails around the state, so she 
sent out an appeal to defense lawyers to call their local sheriff and get 
a list of inmates.138 Sheriffs could provide no proper records for these 
inmates, because “they just poured out of those flooded jails.”139 
Jailers tried to sort out inmates and house them under enormous 
logistical difficulties, but inmates’ medical records did not follow 
them, and psychiatric patients did not receive their medications.140 
 
 135. See Exec. Order No. KBB 2005-32 (2005) (“All deadlines in legal proceedings . . . are 
hereby suspended until at least September 25 . . . .”). Exec. Order No. KBB 2005-67, issued on 
October 19, then asks that the Louisiana Legislature meet to address these issues. See Exec. 
Order No. KBB 2005-67 (2005) (“[I]t has been announced that the Louisiana Legislature will be 
called into a special session . . . for legislative action on these issues . . . .”). 
 136. See Filosa, supra note 3 (“The [volunteer] law students have seen cases in which people 
have been held after their release dates . . . . Some have been held seven months longer than 
what the law allows.”); Purpura, supra note 31 (“[M]ore than 8,000 inmates held in New 
Orleans-area parish jails were evacuated to 34 . . . correctional facilities in Louisiana.”). 
 137. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. ACLU REPORT, supra note 3, at 77. 
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Ultimately, Mann produced a questionnaire for inmates asking 
for their lawyer’s names and pending court dates.141 With the help of 
local sheriffs, she compiled a list and created a website listing inmates 
and their locations.142 Mann and other volunteers interviewed 
thousands of defendants to let them know that someone knew that 
they were there, to try to tell their families they were alive, and to 
contact their attorneys.143 
This ad hoc team of volunteers discovered that defendants fell 
into several categories. Some had already completed their sentences 
or had served more time than they could have received had they been 
convicted.144 Some were incarcerated on minor charges, but had never 
received bond consideration or had been unable to post bond before 
the storm.145 Some had never received counsel at all because they had 
been recently arrested before the storm.146 Finally, some were serving 
sentences or pending trial on more serious charges.147 
Criminal defense lawyers planned to file habeas petitions to 
release several categories of prisoners that they assumed the system 
would be happy to release: those who had served their time and those 
awaiting trial on petty misdemeanors who could be given a 
summons.148 Within two weeks, a New Orleans Municipal Court judge 
signed release orders in the municipal misdemeanor cases, but the 
other cases met resistance.149 Mann and others filed habeas petitions 
in districts around the state where the prisoners were located and 
where venue lay, thus thoroughly annoying rural local judges.150 They 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. The jails had rules requiring that lawyers visiting clients be members of the Louisiana 
bar. Mann negotiated exceptions to the rule requiring (a) that lawyers be visiting their own 
individual clients and (b) that the jail confirm bar membership with the Louisiana bar 
association, whose office was located in New Orleans and was closed. Mann was allowed to 
interview all evacuated prisoners, none of whom were her “clients,” but could only bring 
Louisiana lawyers with her who happened to have their wallet-size bar cards. Volunteers from 
around the country were turned away. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See MacLean, supra note 117 (“Hundreds of prisoners who had either finished their 
terms just before the storm, or faced misdemeanor charges such as public drinking or 
solicitation, were unable to post bond before the storm hit. Or for others who did put up bail, 
computers and phone lines died before they could be processed and released.”). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50. 
 148. Id.; Interview with Nick Trenticosta, supra note 61. 
 149. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50. 
 150. Id. 
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then filed an appellate writ asking the state supreme court to appoint 
a single judge to take charge of the habeas process, or at least one 
judge per district, and asking for a single clerk’s office to accept all of 
the filings.151 The supreme court refused to accept the filing, stating 
that the court was closed and would not be reopened for the purposes 
of hearing the motion, with three justices dissenting.152 
After several months, New Orleans Chief Criminal Judge Calvin 
Johnson provided some relief. He began ordering the release of 
defendants who had served their sentences, and gave the district 
attorney a deadline for charging those who had not yet formally been 
charged.153 That deadline was pushed back, but then finally upheld, by 
the state supreme court.154 On January 6, 2006, the district attorney’s 
office complied with the deadline and filed charges on 1,140 
defendants.155 On September 22, 2005, defense attorney Nick 
Trenticosta also filed a section 1983 petition in federal court, asking 
Judge Jay Zainey to release the women at Angola who should already 
have been released, which Judge Zainey did.156 
Posting bond became difficult where relevant Orleans Parish 
institutions were closed or scattered.157 Wardens could not release 
prisoners without a signed court order or posted bond. The first 
defendant was not released on bond until October.158 State and local 
jailers were slow to release prisoners after posting bond.159 There was 
also a reluctance to release prisoners directly into the communities 
 
 151. See Ansari v. State, 913 So. 2d 834 (La. 2005) (denying an emergency motion to open 
court). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Richard A. Webster, Prisoners Evacuated for Katrina and Scattered in Jails Throughout 
LA Now in Legal Limbo, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, Jan. 16, 2006, at 1, 32. 
 154. See Kimbrough v. Cooper, 915 So. 2d 344, 344, 345 (La. 2005) (“The stay previously 
issued on November 18, 2005, is lifted. . . . [T]he state shall have until 5:00 p.m. on January 6, 
2006, in which to file a bill of information of indictment . . . .”). 
 155. Webster, supra note 153, at 32. 
 156. Complaint for Civil Rights Violations and Request for Injunctive Relief at 10, 
Gettridge v. Gusman, 2005 WL 3162040 (E.D. La. 2005) (No. 2:05-cv-04200-JCZ-KWR); Filosa, 
supra note 59 (noting that Judge Zainey ordered the release on September 22, 2005). 
 157. See MacLean, supra note 117 (“[C]omputers and phone lines died before [prisoners 
who had put up bail] could be processed and released. . . .”); Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra 
note 50. 
 158. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50. 
 159. The criminal defense bar argues that FEMA created a financial incentive for the jails to 
hold inmates too long by reimbursing jailers per inmate per day, though FEMA had yet to pay 
the prisons by January 2006. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50; Interview with Burl 
Cain, supra note 50. 
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surrounding jails.160 Sheriff Gusman sent buses only twice a week to 
collect released prisoners, thus adding days to their sentences without 
authority.161 The process sped up after the Tulane Law School 
Criminal Defense Clinic moved to hold the deputy warden in 
contempt.162 
Phyllis Mann attributes the court system’s early paralysis to 
“Katrina coma,” which rendered “capable, hardworking, talented 
people incapable of decision and action; . . . they were themselves the 
victims of the hurricane, without homes and without family members. 
They were just not functioning.”163 Local courts also, unsurprisingly, 
had failed to plan how they would react to the entire city being almost 
wiped away, or even to make obvious provisional plans for a 
predictable major hurricane. The entity most capable of reacting to 
the crisis across local jurisdictional lines was the state supreme 
court.164 Phyllis Mann argued: 
The Supreme Court should have a system in place that allows for 
law, for civilization to continue in the face of a disaster. . . . We 
literally had no system of law for at least the first two months after 
the hurricane. There were judges who said to us, “the court of 
appeals is closed. Where are you going to go?” No one was in 
charge. The decisions being made were to not make a decision.165 
The state supreme court, itself displaced during the storm, did 
eventually set up offices in Baton Rouge.166 Nevertheless, as noted, 
the supreme court did not ensure the orderly administration of justice 
after the storm. 
Early paralysis during the first two months then persisted for 
more than a year. The court system continued to permit mass 
detentions for upwards of six months for those who still faced 
criminal charges, but who lacked access to defense counsel. Six 
 
 160. Weinstein, supra note 30. 
 161. Interview with Marlin Gusman, supra note 30. 
 162. Interview with Katherine Mattes, Clinical Instructor, Tulane Law School, in New 
Orleans, La. (Oct. 23, 2006). 
 163. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50. 
 164. Interview with Nick Trenticosta, supra note 61; Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 
50. 
 165. Interview with Phyllis Mann, supra note 50. 
 166. Finch, supra note 116. 
04__GARRETT_TETLOW.DOC 11/14/2006  8:38 AM 
152 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:127 
months after Hurricane Katrina, 700 to 1,500 defendants remained 
incarcerated, together with 3,000 who still face charges.167 
Hearings regarding the situation were only finally convened 
following Judge Arthur Hunter’s ruling in February 2006 that post-
Katrina the New Orleans public defender system, with only six 
lawyers remaining, could no longer adequately represent its over four 
thousand clients.168 The effect, as Chief Judge Johnson noted, was “a 
de facto shutdown of the public defender’s office.”169 Judge Hunter 
initially imposed a deadline of summer 2006, almost a year after 
Katrina, before he would even begin to order release of inmates who 
have not seen a lawyer and have not been tried, and order charges 
dropped against three thousand others released but facing charges.170 
He ordered the district attorney’s office to compile a list of indigent 
detainees still facing charges, and stated that he would order their 
release in the summer of 2006 if the state did not provide adequate 
indigent defense funding.171 After repeating and delaying his 
deadlines, Judge Hunter finally released four defendants because of 
inadequacy of counsel on October 6, 2006.172 The district attorney still 
refused to help triage cases, declaring that it was not his job to help 
free defendants.173 
Finally, six months after Katrina, some Louisiana state funding 
was allocated for local indigent defense, but Judge Hunter stated in 
his court order that “instead of the state providing a cure, it has only 
prescribed a Band-Aid and the bleeding continues.”174 Efforts remain 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Perlstein, supra note 4 (“Criminal Court Judge Arthur Hunter ruled that the 
Orleans Parish Indigent Defender Program can no longer adequately represent poor defendants 
[and noted that] ‘[f]or all practical purposes, the public defender program no longer exists.’”). 
 169. Id. (Chief Judge Johnson added, “Crisis is not a big enough word to describe the 
situation. . . . The public defender situation was bad before Katrina. Now it’s a full-blown 
disaster.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 170. Gwen Filosa, Judge says he’ll release inmates unless state pays for lawyers, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Apr. 7, 2006, at B1. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Telephone Interview with Steve Singer, Clinical Professor, Loyola Law School, and 
Chief of Trials, New Orleans Public Defender’s Office (Oct. 6, 2006); Mary Foster, Judge Frees 
Four Inmates Without Lawyers, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 7, 2006. 
 173. Judge Vows to Free Inmates Held Since Katrina Hit (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 25, 
2006) [hereinafter Judge Vows], available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. 
php?storyId=5708448. 
 174. Id. 
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stalled to fundamentally change the methods of funding indigent 
defense to make it sustainable.175  
Beginning in April, law school faculty stepped in to operate and 
redesign the public defender’s office. The judges appointed a new 
board, including Tulane Law School professor Pamela Metzger and 
Loyola Law Professor Dane Ciolino, which then hired Yale Law 
Professor Ronald Sullivan to direct the office and Loyola Clinical 
Professor Steve Singer as chief of trials.176 With scarce resources, the 
new directors have attempted to make major structural reforms such 
as requiring public defenders to work full time.177 The office has 
exactly four working computers, two telephones and a docket of 
thousands of cases.178 
After Katrina, the first criminal bench trial was not held until 
March 31, 2006, and the first jury trial on June 5, 2006.179 During the 
subsequent four months, there were only about fifteen jury trials 
despite three thousand pending cases.180 A year after the storm, prison 
officials, public defenders and law school clinic students continued to 
locate hundreds of inmates who had yet to see a lawyer or a judge.181 
 
 175. Perlstein, supra note 4; see Laura Maggi, Katrina adds to public defender woes, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Mar. 23, 2006, at B1 (describing hearings investigating the adequacy of indigent 
defense in New Orleans Parish, and noting that “a scathing report released this month by a New 
Orleans-based advocacy group found that of 83 interviewed defendants from the city locked up 
before the hurricane hit Aug. 29, just four had met with an attorney”). 
 176. Id.; Laura Maggi, Judge blasts public defender for delay, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 12, 
2006, at B1. Even before taking over the operation of the public defender’s office, law school 
faculty became heavily involved in the crisis. In October, 2005, Chief Judge Johnson appointed 
the Tulane and Loyola Criminal Clinics to represent all indigent defendants for the purpose of 
arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Telephone interview with Pamela Metzger, Associate 
Professor, Tulane Law School (Oct. 23, 2005). 
 177. Maggi, supra note 175; Interview with Steve Singer, supra note 172. 
 178. Judge Vows, supra note 173. 
 179. Filosa, supra note 170; see Gwen Filosa, Orleans trials resume with familiar themes, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 8, 2006, at B1 (reporting that the first six-member jury trial on June 5 
ended with a hung jury, and that the first twelve-member jury acquitted two defendants tried on 
police testimony alone). 
 180. Interview with Steve Singer, supra note 172. 
 181. Gwen Filosa, Pledge to release detainees unmet: Frustrated judge orders report on 
indigents’ cases, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 31, 2006, at B1. On the anniversary of the storm, Judge 
Arthur Hunter issued a ruling stating that “t]he entire criminal justice infrastructure in New 
Orleans is being held together with spit and tape, and it is just a matter of time before the 
system collapses . . . . Now, one year after Hurricane Katrina, the Orleans Public Defenders 
reports it is practically no better off today than it was in February 2006, and far worse than it 
was before Hurricane Katrina.” Id. 
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G. The Federal Response 
The federal government after Katrina did not intervene 
significantly in the criminal justice area. Since the storm, New Orleans 
teeters on the edge of bankruptcy with only two months of operating 
budget; its tax base, made up primarily of property and sales taxes, 
washed away in the storm and will take years to recover.182 In 1988, 
however, Congress passed legislation prohibiting FEMA from 
providing operating expenses to local government, although it may 
provide money for repairing buildings and loans to homeowners and 
businesses.183 In the past, the president forgave emergency loans to 
local government, but Congress amended the Katrina relief bill to 
prohibit forgiveness, and thus local governments signed loan 
applications with dubious promises of an ability to repay, with 
repayments beginning immediately.184 
Nine months after the storm, the Department of Justice gave 
grants totaling $58 million for the benefit of all of the local criminal 
justice systems affected by the storm, including $2.8 million for the 
beleaguered Orleans Parish public defender’s office.185 The office 
remains, however, seriously underfunded. The Justice Department 
commissioned a study estimating the cost of creating a 
constitutionally adequate public defender’s budget at $8.2 million 
annually and with $10.7 million required for the first year to establish 
such an office.186 
 
 182. See Donze, supra note 126 (“Bankruptcy should be considered as an option for New 
Orleans’ financially crippled government and public school system, which are ‘teetering on the 
edge of a cliff’ . . . .”). 
 183. See supra note 7. 
 184. See Landrieu pushes for loans to be forgiven, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 19, 2005, at A7; 
Michelle Millhollon, St. Bernard Officials Say Funding Crucial, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), 
Oct. 4, 2005, at 1-A. President Bush continues to cite the misleading figure of $85 billion 
provided for hurricane relief; however, little was allocated for state or local government. First, 
federal authorities can estimate only that “more than half” of the money has been spent. $29.7 
billion was allocated for “administration”; and $18.5 billion was allocated for payment of flood 
insurance claims, for which homeowners paid premiums. Bill Walsh, Dollars faulted as measure 
of help; ‘$85 billion is a lot,’ but needs remain, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 15, 2006, at A1. $67 
billion of the grand total was allocated for emergency response and recovery. That figure 
includes $5.4 billion for trailers and $5 billion in temporary housing aid, but no money to fund 
local government services. Id. 
 185. Laura Maggi, Indigent office in for nearly $3 million; But it’s a drop in the bucket, 
officials say, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 12, 2006, at B1. 
 186. CHIARKIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 26. The White House’s report describing Katrina 
failings recommends future federal study of federal assistance to local law enforcement. See 
THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 
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II.  EMERGENCY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND FEDERALISM 
The constitutional problem of criminal justice collapse reverses 
the conventional paradigm of constitutional rights during an 
emergency. Courts and scholars have focused since the Founding, and 
more recently since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the 
scope of civil liberties during wartime and executive aggrandizement 
of power during emergencies. None have focused on how 
emergencies affect “everyday criminal justice” provided by local 
government officials, judges, prosecutors, public defenders and 
police.187 Our project here, however, explores that bedrock provision 
of “everyday criminal justice” by local actors and institutions during 
exigent circumstances. The collapse of the New Orleans criminal 
justice system and the response of local, state, and federal 
government in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina present difficult 
new questions about the Constitution’s protective role in the criminal 
system during natural disasters or terrorist attacks. 
We argue that criminal procedure rules remain highly vulnerable 
to failure in their protective roles during times of emergency. Post-
Katrina, criminal procedure rules did not safeguard individual 
liberties nor ensure orderly emergency administration of justice, 
because the unprepared and underresourced local criminal system 
simply collapsed. Doctrines animated by the concept of federalism 
hindered the provision of federal assistance to local institutions which 
could have been of particular help in the period just after the storm. 
Left particularly helpless, long after those first weeks and months, 
were individuals such as indigent criminal defendants whose 
constitutional rights had already been neglected for years. 
A. Indefinite Suspension of Criminal Procedure 
The Constitution’s role in guiding the provision of criminal 
justice in times of emergency remains largely unexplored. The 
 
65–66 (2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf (last visited Aug. 
22, 2006) (calling for a system of “national preparedness”). 
 187. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (noting that the Court uses a standard 
of “heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of 
national security”); Louis D. Bilionis, Conservative Reformation, Popularization, and the 
Lessons Of Reading Criminal Justice As Constitutional Law, 52 UCLA L. REV. 979, 986 (2005) 
(“As those decisions bear out, the dominant American legal mindset strives to conceptualize the 
relevant issues as out-of-the-ordinary struggles between freedom and society, belonging to the 
rubrics of war, emergency, and national security rather than everyday criminal justice.”). 
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response after Katrina provides a case study in the legal and 
normative force of those criminal procedure safeguards when the 
institutions of justice collapse. Far from unduly constraining criminal 
justice actors during emergencies, we argue that several of the 
relevant current constitutional criminal procedure rules already 
sufficiently relax during times of emergency. Nevertheless, post-
Katrina, the constitutional rules that could be bent were broken 
across the board. The rules were not too thin to provide needed 
protection, but remained vulnerable as courts suspended the 
Constitution sub silencio. If state and federal courts had acted more 
quickly to end what amounted to an unconstitutional suspension of 
habeas corpus, local actors could have complied months sooner, 
preventing ongoing constitutional violations that tarnished the 
criminal system and disrupted the lives of thousands detained and 
their families. 
A starting point in examining emergency criminal procedure is 
the Federal Constitution, which contains only one provision on point: 
the Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause states: 
“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, 
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may 
require it.”188 The Clause applies only to the federal government, 
permitting suspension by Congress. It has rarely been invoked, most 
significantly by President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War in a 
manner later found unconstitutional by the Court but then authorized 
by Congress.189 In one previous example of a suspension of habeas 
 
 188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 189. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487); see WILLIAM F. 
DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 145 (1980) (“Lincoln thus believed 
that as Commander-in-chief he had implied power to execute the habeas clause.”); DANIEL 
FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 17–19 (2003) (“Lincoln authorized the suspension of 
habeas corpus anywhere necessary between Philadelphia and Washington.”). Additional 
suspensions occurred during Reconstruction and the War of 1812. See ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 457–58 (1988) 
(“Grant in October 1871 proclaimed a ‘condition of lawlessness’ in nine [South Carolina] 
upcountry counties and suspended the writ of habeas corpus.”). General Andrew Jackson 
ignored one writ of habeas corpus when he imposed martial law in New Orleans. Johnson v. 
Duncan, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 530 (La. 1815); see DUKER, supra, at 142, 172 n.128 (“The Supreme 
Court of Louisiana in Johnson v. Duncan—a case arising from General Andrew Jackson’s 
declaration of martial law in New Orleans during the War of 1812—citing Bollman, declared 
that the Constitution had exclusively vested in Congress the right of suspending the privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus, and that that body was the sole judge of the necessity that called for 
the suspension.”). President Andrew Johnson suspended the writ for a conspirator in President 
Lincoln’s assassination. See REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 165 (“[The government] showed the 
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corpus, after Pearl Harbor, habeas corpus jurisdiction was suspended 
in the then-territory of Hawaii. Martial law was declared with 
authorization of federal legislation, and a U.S. military officer 
appointed “commanding Governor,” for three years, from 1941 to 
1944, closed all courts of the Territory, established military tribunals, 
and suspended habeas corpus.190 The Supreme Court ultimately held 
that the military regime could not “obliterate the judicial system of 
Hawaii.”191 
Most state constitutions have similar suspension clauses, and 
some states have suspended habeas corpus during emergencies; 
Massachusetts, Vermont, and Virginia legislatures suspended the writ 
during Shay’s Rebellion, as did other states during labor strikes in the 
early 1900s.192 Louisiana’s state constitution provides that “[t]he writ 
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended.”193 But even if Louisiana 
courts did not explicitly suspend habeas corpus in violation of the 
Louisiana constitution, they all but extinguished its efficacy in state 
courts. After Katrina, thousands languished in state prisons for 
months, awaiting a chance to meet with an attorney and a decision of 
whether the prosecutor would proceed (required under state law 
within sixty days). Without any legislative suspension of habeas 
 
court the endorsement of President Johnson suspending the writ of habeas corpus, and [Judge 
Andrew] Wylie declined to act further.”). The writ was suspended by the Governor of the 
Philippines during a “state of insecurity and terrorism among the people” resisting U.S. rule. 
Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 179–81 (1906). Additional suspensions included a suspension of 
habeas corpus to combat anti-black violence in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in 1923, and a series of 
suspensions of habeas corpus during labor strikes in mining states including Colorado, Idaho, 
and West Virginia. Martial Law Widened After New Outrage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1923, at 2; see 
generally Note, Habeas Corpus-Strikes-Suspension, 38 YALE L.J. 545 (1929) (reviewing labor 
strike suspensions of habeas corpus in various states). 
 190. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 309 (1946); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 6, 
at 212–17 (offering an account of “Hawaii under martial law”). 
 191. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 315. 
 192. See, e.g., An Act to prevent Routs, Riots, and tumultuous Assemblies, and the evil 
Consequences thereof, 1786 Mass. Acts, ch. 8 (prohibiting “any persons to the number of 
twelve, or more, being armed with clubs, or other weapons [from remaining] unlawfully, 
routously, riotously or tumultuously assembled . . .”); Vermont Riot Act of 1787, reprinted in 14 
STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT: LAWS OF VERMONT 265–66, 281–84 (J. Williams ed., 1966); 
Virginia Riot Act of 1786, reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 517–19 (J. Boyd 
ed., 1955); Richard H. Kohn, The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Framers, 
in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–
1989, at 69–72 (Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991); Jason Collins Weid, A Republic of Emergencies: 
Martial Law in American Jurisprudence, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1397, 1413–16 (2004) (describing 
state court suspensions of habeas corpus in response to strikes). 
 193. LA. CONST. art. I, § 21. 
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corpus, the state court system suspended its rules and failed to hold 
any hearings regarding the prisoners. Only a few state courts haltingly 
granted habeas petitions and ordered release of prisoners. And again, 
most prisoners had no access to counsel and only a few were 
represented by counsel to file habeas petitions. Worse, when a few 
trial judges did approve the grant of habeas corpus petitions, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and delayed the releases, citing its 
suspension of court deadlines. Federal courts granted relief to only a 
few prisoners.194 
Detaining thousands of prisoners indefinitely, often under 
misdemeanor charges, violated a host of constitutional provisions, yet 
we argue that each violation was entirely preventable in the months 
that followed Hurricane Katrina. 
First, the Due Process Clause provides a constitutional right of 
access to attorneys and to courts.195 The state’s failure to ensure that 
counsel and families promptly received information about the 
location of clients during an indefinite detention by the state raises 
substantial constitutional concerns.196 
Second, defendants clearly do not have constitutionally adequate 
representation if no counsel is available even to meet with them, 
much less represent them.197 Most of the thousands of detainees had 
no defense lawyer to raise constitutional claims and have not even 
seen a public defender. The six public defenders remaining in New 
Orleans after Katrina198 simply could not handle 4,200 backlogged 
cases; they did not try, and instead struggled to keep up with 
arraignments in new cases.199 Yet state courts waited over six months 
before even convening hearings regarding the lack of indigent 
defense counsel; out-of-state volunteer lawyers were not even 
solicited. 
Third, the Sixth Amendment also provides for a “right to a 
speedy . . . trial,”200 because as the Supreme Court has stated, 
 
 194. On federalism and reasons why they might have deferred—improperly, we argue—to a 
suspended state court system, see infra Part II.B.1. 
 195. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding that failure to provide library 
facilities violated the right of access to courts). 
 196. See id.; see also Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
 197. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 198. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra text accompanying note 133. 
 200. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial . . . .”). 
04__GARRETT_TETLOW.DOC 11/14/2006  8:38 AM 
2006] CRIMINAL JUSTICE COLLAPSE 159 
“inordinate delay between arrest, indictment, and trial may impair a 
defendant’s ability to present an effective defense.”201 Trials are 
unlikely within the state statutory deadline;202 “for ten months after 
the water receded, not a single jury trial” occurred in New Orleans.203 
As for the 700 to 1,500 defendants still incarcerated six months 
after the storm, many for minor charges, together with approximately 
3,000 who also still faced charges but had not been tried,204 Chief 
Judge Johnson noted, “If I were a defense lawyer, I would raise 
[speedy trial claims] every moment, every opportunity that I get . . . I 
would be standing on top of tables raising it.”205 
Fourth, due process should prevent the state from imprisoning 
persons months beyond their release dates, particularly for 
misdemeanors such as drinking in public, disturbing the peace, and 
failing to pay tickets, and especially without providing counsel or 
charging them with any crime.206 As noted, for months, “persons 
arrested in New Orleans the weekend preceding the storm—many for 
minor offenses, such as begging, prostitution, or drunk-and-
disorderly—were still awaiting their hearing in a prison facility in 
some far corner of the state.”207 Hearings to free those incarcerated 
for minor charges should have been held promptly once courts 
reopened, not months later. 
 
 201. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). 
 202. According to LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 578 (2003), “[N]o trial shall be 
commenced . . . [i]n misdemeanor cases after one year from the date of institution of the 
prosecution.” 
 203. Harriet Ryan, Justice delayed: ‘We the jury’ and other words unheard in New Orleans 
since Katrina, COURT TV NEWS, Mar. 20, 2006, http://www.courttv.com/news/neworleans/ 
032006_notrials_ctv.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2006); Filosa, supra note 170; see Gwen Filosa, 
Orleans trials resume with familiar themes, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 8, 2006, at B1. 
 204. Ryan, supra note 203. 
 205. Id. (ellipsis in original). 
 206. Such detention arguably violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979) (“Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not 
be punished.”); cf. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991) (“[P]rolonged 
detention based on incorrect or unfounded suspicion may unjustly ‘imperil [a] suspect’s job, 
interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships.’” (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 
420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975))) (second alteration in original). 
 207. Jack King, In The Wake Of The Hurricanes: NACDL Responds Quickly; Defense Bars 
Regroup and Rebuild, CHAMPION, Nov. 2005, at 4, 10. 
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Finally, the excessive bail clause applies where individuals were 
detained without an opportunity to pay bail, or where judges set 
excessively high bail for misdemeanors.208 
These constitutional provisions could have been complied with 
had courts: insisted on prompt identification of prisoners and release 
of their names to counsel and permitted attorney access (to provide 
access to courts); permitted out-of-state volunteer attorneys to help, 
and insisted on funding for public defenders for prosecutions to 
proceed (to ensure adequate indigent defense counsel); conducted 
hearings to release misdemeanor detainees (to address the due 
process problem of indefinite detention for minor crimes); insisted 
prosecutors issue prompt charge decisions or permit guilty pleas; 
conducted proceedings in absentia including to reduce bail; and if all 
else failed, granted habeas petitions. 
The failure to accomplish those steps was more than 
understandable in the immediate weeks after the storm. Each of 
those steps, however, could have been taken within months when 
courts reopened. Instead, even after a year, actors violated 
constitutional criminal procedure rather than restore normalcy.209 
Local judges, themselves elected officials, repeatedly threatened to 
dismiss cases and release prisoners, but never acted on their threats, 
fearing perhaps the release of one who would then commit a violent 
crime. Yet those judges did not ensure that prosecutors and defense 
attorneys conducted proper screening to permit release of those 
arrested for petty violations who posed no such danger. The system 
simply collapsed with courts conducting no hearings and no trials, and 
with no defense counsel available. 
Nor did any executive reach out to assume powers over criminal 
justice matters. Instead, the official response institutionalized the 
Louisiana judiciary’s fundamental inability to maintain the orderly 
administration of the criminal process. The Louisiana legislature 
 
 208. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752–55 (1984) (invoking the Excessive Bail 
Clause to assess the facial constitutionality of a statute which allowed a judicial officer to deny 
certain arrestees an opportunity to pay bail); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (“Bail set at a 
figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill [its] purpose is ‘excessive’ under 
the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 209. One might think emergencies would merely provide an additional period of necessity 
justifying crafting of exceptions to constitutional rules; instead the rules were suspended 
entirely. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 963 (1995) (“A rule 
with necessity or emergency exceptions might be described, somewhat imprecisely, as a strong 
presumption.”). 
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passed permanent legislation permitting courts to suspend habeas 
corpus for ninety days and indefinitely thereafter until the governor-
declared “emergency” subsides. The legislature thus confirmed that 
what occurred after Katrina was, effectively, a state court suspension 
of habeas corpus.210 
Related was the failure to respond systematically to the 
emergency by reconsidering overcriminalization.211 The elected 
district attorney did not, after months passed, triage cases and release 
persons imprisoned for petty crimes or who had already completed 
their sentences. When an emergency sorely stresses the public order, 
expending criminal justice resources on minor infractions has a 
greater relative cost to government, but worse, incarceration imposes 
a greater social cost on families already strained and separated during 
an emergency. Mark Tushnet writes that emergencies “provide new 
information relevant to the assessment of the costs and benefits of 
some policies.”212 Those costs and benefits were not reconsidered by 
criminal justice actors in Louisiana. 
Thus, a state criminal system effectively suspended habeas 
corpus for months in the face of mass detentions, long after courts 
had reconvened and could have held hearings, long after prosecutors 
could have conducted screening and triage of cases (and long after an 
ad hoc team of volunteers conducted their own screening). The 
legislature and the governor likewise failed to intervene. As a result, 
thousands languished in prisons and families remained separated, 
adding to post-Katrina dislocation and trauma. It remains to be seen 
whether any will receive civil compensation for the ordeals that they 
suffered.213 
 
 210. See infra notes 262–64 and accompanying text. 
 211. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 509 (2001) (“The . . . natural assumption is that the public would want to criminalize only 
the kinds of things criminals, understood in the ordinary sense of that word, do. Yet 
contemporary criminal codes cover a good deal of marginal middle-class behavior . . . .”). 
 212. Mark Tushnet, Issues of Method in Analyzing the Policy Response to Emergencies, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1581, 1589 (2004). 
 213. Regarding the ACLU lawsuit filed on behalf of a group of detainees in New Orleans 
Parish prison, see supra note 111. See also, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, 
and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 48–51, 53–56 (describing standard 
to show malicious prosecution and elements of section 1983 claims alleging wrongful 
convictions); see generally Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework For Compensating 
Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947 (2005) (arguing that excessive use of pre-trial 
detention should be considered a compensable “liberty taking”). 
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B. Federalism and Vulnerability of Local Criminal Justice Actors 
While criminal procedure rights did not help or constrain law 
enforcement, but were instead ignored, a second set of 
constitutionally-inspired federalism principles hindered provision of 
emergency relief. Lingering in the aftermath of Katrina is the 
question of why federal assistance came so slowly to local criminal 
justice actors, when it came at all. As to law enforcement assistance, 
for example, federalism delayed relief as President Bush and 
Governor Blanco debated the form of military help. The 
complications of “Our Federalism,” which long has characterized our 
approach to criminal law, contributed to confusion resulting in 
meager assistance provided post-Katrina, not just of federal troops, 
but also by judicial review of habeas petitions and financial assistance 
to criminal courts, prisons, prosecutors and indigent defense 
attorneys. Nevertheless, a lack of local resources before the 
emergency made the New Orleans local criminal justice system 
already vulnerable. Federal and judicial reluctance to intervene post-
Katrina can be in part attributed to the practical limits of their ability 
to remedy such longstanding structural deficiencies of local criminal 
justice actors. 
1. Hindering Emergency Relief.  Federalism, or doctrines that 
limit intrusion on prerogatives of state and local government, 
characterizes the Supreme Court’s approach to regulating local 
criminal justice institutions under the Constitution.214 The Court has 
repeatedly held that matters of criminal justice are the states’ 
“primary authority” and that federal courts may not intrude on 
 
 214. See Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (1987) (“It is not that the states deserve autonomy simply 
because they are states, but rather that it is appropriate to leave the states alone, to accord them 
a ‘separate sphere,’ [sic] because the ‘National Government will fare best’ that way.” (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971))); Barry Friedman, Valuing 
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1997) (“To all appearances, the United States has a 
federal system. This generally means that regulatory authority is divided between a national 
government and many state governments. Those governments are free, within constitutional 
bounds, to develop and pursue their own regulatory agendas, supported by the power to tax and 
spend.”); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1402 
(1997) (“[F]ederalism is a decentralized decisionmaking system that is . . . responsive to local 
interests and preference, that can tailor programs to local conditions and needs, and that can 
provide innovation in creating new programs.”). 
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criminal law,215 an area “where States historically have been 
sovereign.”216 That traditional deference to state and community 
administration of justice, though justified for a host of reasons, had 
unexpected harmful effects on the ability of actors to respond and 
recover after Hurricane Katrina. Federal assistance, in several areas, 
would have provided crucial support, particularly in the period 
immediately following the storm when state and local actors 
remained in the greatest disarray. 
Principles of federalism made it more difficult for the federal 
government to assist local police in need. First, federal officials 
remain barred from conducting law enforcement by the 
Reconstruction-era Posse Comitatus Act, which makes it a federal 
crime for federal troops to “execute the laws” in the states.217 The Act 
sought not to prevent emergency assistance, but rather to prevent 
federal officials from monitoring Jim Crow elections after 
Reconstruction.218 The Constitution also limits domestic exercise of 
federal military power (already prevented under Posse Comitatus 
from conducting law enforcement) to two limited emergency 
circumstances, during a natural disaster or during domestic violence, 
but only with the governor’s consent or to enforce a federal court’s 
 
 215. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (“The States possess primary authority 
for defining and enforcing the criminal law. . . . Federal intrusions into state criminal trials 
frustrate both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to 
honor constitutional rights.”). 
 216. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995); see United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (“We . . . reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, 
violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce. 
The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (“The power of the Federal Government would 
be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service—and at no cost to itself—
the police officers of the 50 States.”); see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) 
(“Our national government is one of delegated powers alone. Under our federal system the 
administration of criminal justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the 
scope of those delegated powers, has created offenses against the United States.”). 
 217. See Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000) (prohibiting use of armed forces to 
“execute the laws” and making willful violation punishable by up to two years imprisonment). 
Posse comitatus refers to the common law power of a sheriff to call up a “posse” of able-bodied 
people to assist in arrests or to suppress riots. E.g., Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238, 240–41 (4th 
Cir. 1973); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1200–01 (8th ed. 2004). 
 218. See, e.g., United States v. Allred, 867 F.2d 856, 870 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The legislative and 
judicial history of the Act, however, indicates that its purpose springs from an attempt to end 
the use of federal troops to police state elections in ex-Confederate states.”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-
71, pt. II, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1785, 1787 (“[N]o one has been charged 
or prosecuted under the Posse Comitatus Act since its enactment.”). 
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order.219 These requirements create possibilities for crossed signals 
during emergencies, as after Katrina when battles over federalism and 
whether the governor had consented delayed crucial military 
assistance for rescue missions. Further, federal troops lack law 
enforcement training because, after all, the Posse Comitatus Act 
prohibits law enforcement.220 
Similarly, principles of federalism supported federal courts’ 
reluctance to grant petitions for the release of the thousands of 
indefinitely detained prisoners after Hurricane Katrina. Federal 
courts must abstain under Younger v. Harris221 from enjoining 
pending state prosecutions.222 The Court’s rationale in Younger was 
based on “the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state 
functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up 
of a Union of separate state governments . . . . This . . . is referred to 
by many as ‘Our Federalism . . . .’”223 The Court did note that perhaps 
in “extraordinary circumstances” when a threat is “great and 
immediate” and “when absolutely necessary for protection of 
 
 219. The first of the Militia Clauses permits Congress to call the militia, our modern day 
National Guard, but only to “suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
8, cl. 15 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute 
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”). Also the Constitution 
permits the president to call the National Guard upon the request of a state to protect against 
“domestic Violence” short of a national emergency. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United 
States . . . shall protect each of them [the States] against Invasion; and on Application of the 
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic 
Violence.”); see also 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) (“Whenever there is an insurrections [sic] in any 
State . . . the President may, upon the request of [that State’s] legislature or of its governor if the 
legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, 
in the number requested by that State . . . .”). 
 220. See Baum, supra note 15, at 60 (“[The author] asked a sergeant first class what he and 
his men were permitted to do . . . . ‘We’re just trick-or-treating,’ he said. ‘If I saw someone going 
in that store right there, I couldn’t do anything but radio it in.’”) Perhaps those reasons explain 
why, despite the president’s call for “greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed 
forces” during emergencies, no such authority has been granted by Congress. See Angie C. 
Marek, National Security Watch: The militarization of disaster response, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050921/21natsec.htm (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2006). 
 221. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
 222. See id. at 41, 49, 53–54 (holding that federal courts may not enjoin pending state 
prosecutions); see also Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the 
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 75 (1984) (“The Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine 
provides that a federal court may not enjoin an ongoing state criminal proceeding, even to 
protect federal constitutional rights.” (footnote omitted)). 
 223. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. 
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constitutional rights,” federal courts could enjoin criminal actions.224 
After Katrina, the threat to constitutional rights arguably appeared 
quite great, immediate, and not adequately remedied in largely closed 
state courts (in which prosecutions were arguably not “pending”). 
Federal judges granted only a few hundred habeas or section 1983 
petitions after Katrina, and they did not issue written opinions. The 
Younger abstention doctrine, despite its exceptions, may explain why 
federal courts failed to intervene more broadly to grant relief to the 
thousands of illegally detained prisoners that remained, and why 
defense lawyers did not seek more sweeping relief. 
Still more troubling, principles of federalism also hindered the 
provision of financial aid sorely needed at least in the immediate 
period following the storm. Given their already sparse resources, 
financial assistance, not military patrols, might have been the most 
useful federal contribution to local police, courts, prisons, prosecutors 
and public defenders. Yet legislation providing for disaster relief and 
funding also reflects traditional reluctance to interfere with local law 
government. The federal executive branch has been granted a raft of 
statutory emergency powers under the Stafford Act,225 which allows 
the federal government to provide aid to families226 and repair 
damaged buildings.227 The Act does not, however, provide for or 
permit payment of operating expenses for local government, and thus 
the only aid law enforcement or criminal courts can receive is to 
repair buildings. There is no routine source for federal emergency 
criminal justice funding, and no funding was provided during the 
crucial months after Hurricane Katrina.228 The federal government 
could provide support without undermining local law enforcement by 
funding implementation of emergency plans to assist lawyers, courts, 
prisons, and police in administering justice during emergencies. 
 
 224. Id. at 45 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926)). 
 225. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5206 (2000)). 
 226. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5174, 5177–5183 (2000). 
 227. Id. §§ 5171–5172. 
 228. The Justice Department does provide grants for pilot projects through its Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, and it did later provide a grant of $58 million for courts, prosecutors, 
indigent defense, and law enforcement, which will provide some emergency assistance for the 
local criminal justice systems in the New Orleans region, but “is not enough to tackle needed 
systemic changes.” Maggi, supra note 185. 
04__GARRETT_TETLOW.DOC 11/14/2006  8:38 AM 
166 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:127 
2. The Persistence of Inadequate Indigent Defense.  Doctrines of 
federalism had unanticipated effects, hindering efforts to release 
detained prisoners, assist law enforcement, and provide financial 
support to local law enforcement. Nevertheless, the efficacy of federal 
assistance after an emergency has limits. Federal assistance, including 
judicial review of indefinite detentions, could have provided 
important assistance, particularly during the initial period after the 
storm. The sustained nature of the local institutional collapse for 
upwards of a year, however, must be attributed to the local criminal 
system’s vulnerability during an emergency. The New Orleans 
criminal system remained precariously balanced before the 
emergency for a variety of reasons, including the political 
unpopularity of expending resources for indigent defendants, lack of 
resources, and lack of planning, all in addition to insufficient 
enforcement of constitutional rules. The longstanding problem of 
indigent defense funding in particular provides a clear example of the 
limitations of judicial enforcement of constitutional rights given 
underlying vulnerability of local criminal justice institutions. 
The underlying lack of criminal justice resources in the area of 
indigent defense reflects no simple cause, but rather systemic 
problems in many jurisdictions, not just New Orleans, that have 
persisted for decades. Although Louisiana provides very low indigent 
defense funding and is the only state to rely chiefly on traffic tickets 
and court costs to fund indigent defense, studies have shown 
pervasive underfunding of indigent defense in many other states.229 
 
 229. See A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 8 (2004) 
(“[A] significant funding crisis persists today. Throughout [hearings conducted by the A.B.A.’s 
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants], witnesses from each of the 
twenty-two states examined reported grave inadequacies in the available funds and resources 
for indigent defense.”); NAT’L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS’N, supra note 13, at 31–32 
(“Alabama’s plan for defender services has been universally criticized for its systematic 
deficiencies, including inadequate funding. . . . [I]t is . . . telling that Louisiana’s funding does not 
even match Alabama’s low threshold.”); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY 
EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 34, 36–37 (2003), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/indigent 
defexpend2003.pdf (tabular state by state comparison shows twenty-six states with less annual 
state-wide indigent defense funding than Louisiana, though some significant variation can also 
be explained by caseloads, presence of death penalty cases, appointment of counsel for 
misdemeanor cases and civil cases); see generally THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A 
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA (2004), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/va-report2004.pdf (study 
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Similarly, in other states, studies report that due to inadequate 
resources, in nonemergency circumstances, indigent arrestees often 
wait weeks or months in detention before seeing a lawyer.230 
Perhaps because the problem of grossly underfunded indigent 
defense counsel has remained so widespread and intractable, the 
Supreme Court elaborated a constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel, but has stopped short of setting any baseline 
level of resources. The Supreme Court’s current constitutional test 
reflects the limitations of judicially-enforced criminal procedure 
rights and the role of federalism, but also the failings of local 
institutional actors. The Court’s test asks in an individual case 
whether counsel was “reasonably effective” and whether there was 
prejudice to the outcome at trial.231 Commentators have criticized the 
test, arguing that given local political unwillingness to fund indigent 
criminal defense, “Gideon requires some budgetary floors if it is to 
fulfill its promise.”232 According to the Supreme Court, however, an 
advantage of its approach is to avoid the need for inquiry into 
systemic inadequacy. As the Court put it, “the entire criminal justice 
system” should not “suffer[]” the burden of litigating such claims.233 
Principles of federalism counseled against intruding into state and 
local policy choices regarding the baseline level of resources for 
criminal justice; the Court does not typically define constitutional 
rights as “affirmative” rights or entitlements for the indigent, whether 
 
documenting grossly inadequate indigent defense resources based on data collection in eleven 
states). 
 230. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note 
229, at 23 (“[I]n some places throughout the country, poor persons accused of crime are arrested 
and detained in local jails for months or even years before they have a chance to speak with a 
lawyer.”). 
 231. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 232. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 70 (1997). 
 233. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
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the context is public benefits,234 education,235 medical care,236 police 
protection,237 or criminal law.238 (One exception to that general rule 
applies to those in custody, for whom the government assumes an 
affirmative obligation to provide reasonably safe conditions, food, 
clothing, and medical care.)239 Such deferential principles give 
localities the primary responsibility to fund counsel for the indigent at 
appropriate levels to ensure constitutionally adequate defense. 
New Orleans and the State of Louisiana failed to do so for 
decades. The Louisiana courts, a decade before Katrina, ruled against 
the grossly underfunded indigent defense system in New Orleans. In 
1993, Chief Judge Johnson held a series of hearings on defense 
services after a public defender, Richard Teissier of the Orleans 
Indigent Defender Program, informed the court that he had no 
investigator, no funding for experts, and so many cases—418 cases to 
be precise—that his clients were “routinely incarcerated 30 to 70 days 
 
 234. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260, 262 (1970) (reaching question regarding due 
process rights of recipients of statutory welfare benefits, but not reaching whether there was any 
constitutional right to such benefits); Barbara Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, 
and the Due Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 982, 1005 (1996) (“Courts are not institutionally 
equipped to make the adjustments and readjustments necessary to resolve budget-allocation 
issues.”); see also Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of 
Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 420 (1993) (“[E]ven if we assume some rough 
operational understanding of . . . each minimum entitlement . . . much more would have to be 
decided: . . . . The[se] are questions that seem far better addressed by the legislative and 
executive branches of government, questions that seem virtually out of the reach of the judiciary 
absent special circumstances.”). 
 235. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 452, 461–62, 463, 465 (1988) (holding 
that schools may charge bus fees to indigent families); San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental right). 
 236. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) (“The Constitution imposes no obligation 
on the States to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigents.”). 
 237. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 187, 202 (1989) (“A 
State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative duties of care and 
protection upon its agents as it wishes. But not ‘all common-law duties owed by government 
actors were . . . constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335 (1986)) (omission in original); Reiff v. City of Philadelphia, 471 F. 
Supp. 1262, 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (“The Constitution does not explicitly or implicitly provide a 
right to adequate police protection.”). 
 238. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (refusing to set a baseline level of resources which a 
criminal justice system must provide the indigent). 
 239. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1976) 
(holding that a state violates the Eighth Amendment when it exhibits deliberate indifference to 
a prisoner’s serious medical needs). 
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before he meets with them.”240 Chief Judge Johnson concluded in this 
case that the system of indigent defense in New Orleans was 
unconstitutional and ordered the legislature to provide funding.241 The 
Supreme Court of Louisiana on appeal agreed that indigent criminal 
defendants in New Orleans received unconstitutionally inadequate 
counsel, but was unwilling to order the Legislature to provide 
additional funding (beyond the local funds from court fees and 
tickets) for separation-of-powers reasons.242 The legislature then 
created a state-funded Louisiana Indigent Defender Assistance 
Board,243 though over time gross inadequacies reappeared,244 requiring 
an additional judicial intervention that was still pending before 
Katrina.245 
Thus, courts may only with great difficulty ameliorate 
longstanding institutional neglect, and only sustained review may 
address persistent constitutional violations. Further, before-the-fact 
attention is essential, given the even greater difficulty of a systemic 
response after an emergency. The New Orleans system has only 
slowly addressed the problem of inadequate indigent representation 
in hearings convened following Judge Hunter’s ruling in February 
2006 that after Katrina, the New Orleans public defender system 
could no longer adequately represent its over 4,000 clients.246 Indeed, 
 
 240. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993). For additional discussion of the case, see 
Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure Of Courts To Address Underfunded Indigent Defense 
Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736–38 (2005). 
 241. Peart, 621 So. 2d at 784–85. As a result, Peart received additional resources for his case, 
resulting in acquittals on the charges against him in two separate trials. Id. at 785 & n.4. 
 242. Id. at 791. 
 243. 1997 La. Acts No. 1361, § 1 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:151 (2005)); see 
State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 336 (La. 2005) (discussing the legislature’s creation in 2003 of a 
“blue ribbon” Louisiana Task Force on Indigent Defense Services to make reform 
recommendations); Lee Hargrave, Ruminations: Mandates in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974; 
How Did They Fare?, 58 LA. L. REV. 389, 398 n.45 (1998) (“In 1993, just before Peart was 
decided, legislation to provide better funding for indigent defense was defeated. The legislature 
did provide $5 million additional funds in 1994 and 1995. Also, after a report by an advisory 
commission, the 1997 legislature established the Indigent Defense Assistance Board.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 244. See Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-The-Fact Review of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 8 (“Over time, the money failed to keep 
up with inflation and caseloads, and today New Orleans defense counsel still have heavy 
caseloads.”). 
 245. Before Katrina, the Louisiana Supreme Court again intervened and ruled that a “trial 
judge may halt the prosecution of [capital] cases” if sufficient indigent defense funding was not 
timely provided. Citizen, 898 So. 2d at 339. 
 246. Perlstein, supra note 4. 
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Richard Teissier, no longer a public defender, was appointed Special 
Master to develop a plan to revise the indigent defense system.247 
Teissier noted, “It was broke before . . . . Now it’s rubble. It’s like the 
Lower 9th Ward. It’s completely ravaged of even the appearance of a 
public defender’s office.”248 Local efforts remain ongoing to change 
fundamentally the system of indigent defense, though the local tax 
base remains devastated, and state and federal assistance to date 
cannot support an adequate system of representation.249 The Justice 
Department has suggested that only a structural intervention can now 
revive and recreate the formerly thirty-person and now six-person 
New Orleans public defender staff so that it can adequately represent 
its thousands of clients.250 Attempts to intervene will remain 
inadequate until the sources of funding are improved and stabilized. 
Framing the legal and policy problem of regulating baseline 
resources as a safeguard for basic functioning of the criminal justice 
system in times of emergency might encourage local, state or federal 
actors to rethink the persistent problem of inadequate indigent 
defense. Policymakers might start to view the problem in a different 
light, as implicating the fundamental legitimacy of the criminal 
process. Courts might also view differently case law regarding 
inadequate funding for indigent counsel, which has never considered 
the emergency provision of justice.251 Actors might particularly 
scrutinize indigent defense funding contingent upon funding sources 
that remain equivocal after an emergency. 
Nevertheless, past and present experience in New Orleans 
illustrates both the promise and the difficulties of relying upon 
political actors and courts to remedy systematic vulnerability of local 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Maggi, supra note 175; Perlstein, supra note 4 (“The chairman of the [Orleans Parish 
Indigent Defender Program] Board, Frank DeSalvo, vowed to return with a plan to resume 
operations. ‘Sometimes you just have to do the best with what you’ve got,’ DeSalvo said.”); see 
supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text (regarding state and federal contributions to date). 
 250. See CHIARKIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 10 (“[W]e present recommendations for both 
short-term and long-term actions to address the indigent defense needs in Orleans Parish. The 
short-term actions are primarily . . . to oversee the restructuring of the public defender 
program . . . . The long-term actions are generally . . . to restructure the defender program.”). 
 251. Further, requiring that government provide a baseline amount of funding to ensure 
minimally adequate counsel could be fairly simple for courts to police. See Stuntz, supra note 
232, at 70–71 (“No judicial micromanagement would be necessary. Unlike prison cases, testing 
compliance with judicial decrees would seem to be easy: Either the required appropriations 
were made or they weren’t.”). 
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criminal justice institutions. With these deep longstanding limitations 
in mind, the next Part discusses potential reforms aimed at enabling 
reluctant institutional actors to address the problem of emergency 
criminal justice. 
III.  AN EMERGENCY CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina calls into question the 
ability of the criminal justice system’s diffuse, divided, administrative 
structure to respond to emergencies. As Professor William Stuntz 
writes, “[F]or all its flaws, centralization does have one large 
advantage—it permits easy adaptation to changed circumstances.”252 
Decentralized local, state, and federal actors could not join together 
to respond to adversity. After a crisis, it may prove difficult to 
preserve constitutional functioning among constituent parts of a 
criminal system, each with different or adverse interests and each 
disparately affected by the emergency. Actors may agree, however, in 
advance of a crisis to reach compromises regarding emergency 
resources and procedures. We discuss below possibilities for 
centralization and coordination in an emergency-oriented criminal 
justice system. 
A. The Kerner Commission Model 
The travails of the Louisiana criminal justice system are not new; 
the federal government proposed a range of reforms aimed at 
preventing such a criminal justice collapse after nationwide urban 
unrest and riots in 1967. President Lyndon Johnson appointed a 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, known as the 
Kerner Commission, to make recommendations.253 The Commission 
found that many cities experienced preventable failures in the 
administration of criminal justice,254 and a chapter of the report 
addressed the need for emergency planning to avoid aggravating 
conditions of disorder.255 
 
 252. Stuntz, supra note 6, at 2148 n.21. 
 253. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 15–16 (1968). 
 254. See id. at 183 (“Partially paralyzed by decades of neglect, deficient in facilities, 
procedures and personnel, overwhelmed by the demands of normal operations, lower courts 
have staggered under the crushing new burdens of civil disorders.”). 
 255. See id. at 183–95 (chapter entitled “The Administration of Justice Under Emergency 
Conditions”). 
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Specifically, the Kerner Commission recommended that the 
criminal justice system be used sparingly during an emergency to 
maintain order rather than resort to mass arrests.256 The New Orleans 
criminal justice system, like most, lacked any such protocols to limit 
the scope of arrests or to handle mass arrests under emergency 
conditions. The Kerner Commission also recommended that “each 
community . . . undertake the difficult but essential task of reform and 
emergency planning . . . to meet emergency needs.”257 The Kerner 
Commission also suggested that local law enforcement develop 
“mutual assistance pacts” and also interstate mutual assistance 
agreements.258 In response, lawyers and police in several cities, 
including New York and Washington, D.C., convened and issued 
procedures for the “Administration of Justice Under Emergency 
Conditions,” while others all but ignored the recommendations.259 
Despite the limitations of expert study groups, such planning 
could at least begin the process of preparation to avoid criminal 
justice collapse. Nevertheless, few efforts have been made post-
Katrina to revive such planning. No “Katrina Criminal Justice 
Commission” has investigated the causes of the criminal justice 
collapse we describe, nor has any been convened.260 On the other 
 
 256. Id. at 189. The Kerner Commission also reported that mass arrests resulted in few 
successful prosecutions, but instead caused overcrowding of facilities, inability of defense 
lawyers to locate clients, and failure of prosecutors to screen cases. Id. at 184–85. 
 257. Id. at 187. Additionally, the Kerner Commission recommended specific planning 
guidelines for communities to implement. Id. at 187–95, 282–83. 
 258. Id. at 283–86. 
 259. See generally COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IN THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA (1973) (recommending procedures to the Judicial Conference of the District of 
Columbia to implement following an emergency); CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING 
COUNCIL & VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER EMERGENCY 
CONDITIONS (1969) (recommending procedures for New York City’s criminal justice system to 
implement following an emergency). 
 260. A White House report calls for future study of the problem. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 
186. The Senate rejected a call for an independent Katrina Commission, opting for an 
investigative commission composed of members of Congress. See Charles Babington & Shailagh 
Murray, Parties Scramble for Post-Katrina Leverage, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at A6 
(“[C]ongressional Republicans . . . announc[ed] the formation of an investigative commission 
that they can control. They rejected Democratic appeals to model the panel after the Sept. 11 
commission, which was made up of non-lawmakers and was equally balanced between 
Republicans and Democrats.”). That commission’s report discusses a “breakdown in law 
enforcement” in police and military responses. The report, however, discusses no other criminal 
justice issues and makes no recommendations. SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE 
PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: THE 
FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION 
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hand, it is heartening that the Department of Justice assembled a 
group that has issued comprehensive recommendations regarding the 
central problem of funding and design of a sound public defender’s 
office in New Orleans.261 Failures along lines familiar since the 1960s 
suggest the need to again study and address criminal justice 
administration during emergencies. 
B. Toward Emergency Courts 
When an emergency threatens physical safety, criminal justice 
institutions take on heightened importance. Criminal justice actors 
share an important role in maintaining calm and order during 
emergencies. During the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, far from 
presenting a deliberative well-planned response, all actors remained 
in disarray. Below we indicate ways that criminal justice institutions 
could better coordinate during crises. 
Legislation in Louisiana adopted a scheme in which a central 
court receives administrative authority in times of emergency. The 
Louisiana Legislature in effect codified the governor’s and the state 
supreme court’s suspension of habeas corpus, stating that in future 
“emergencies and disasters of unprecedented size and destructiveness 
resulting from terrorist events, enemy attack, sabotage, or other 
hostile action, or from fire, flood, earthquake, or other natural or 
manmade causes,”262 once the governor issues an “emergency order” 
all state speedy trial requirements and other deadlines will be 
suspended for ninety days, and the supreme court may extend the 
suspension upon a determination that it is “necessary.”263 The law also 
creates “emergency sessions” for courts, so that where courts are 
damaged and closed, the default venue for prisoners in detention 
would be transferred to Baton Rouge (or if Baton Rouge is affected, 
another unaffected jurisdiction).264 As a result, during future 
emergencies courts will (1) consolidate criminal cases in a district 
unaffected, and (2) delay resolution of criminal cases. 
The Louisiana Legislature realized that emergencies make 
criminal justice a shared concern, with prisoners transferred 
 
FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 241 (2006), available at http://katrina.house.gov/ 
full_katrina_report.htm. 
 261. See CHIARKIS ET AL., supra note 12, at 9–16 (reporting the group’s recommendations). 
 262. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 941(1) (2005). 
 263. Id. art. 955(A)–(C). 
 264. Id. art. 944, 945(B). 
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throughout the state. Establishing a trained, prepared default court 
could avoid future confusion about jurisdiction and authority during 
an emergency. Nevertheless, that “emergency session” serves only as 
a default court. The legislature did not take any steps to ensure that it 
was a trained default actor, or even an actor with resources to cope 
with emergencies. Nor did the legislature task the “emergency 
session” with any planning role that might prepare it for future 
emergencies. Nor do other states have criminal justice institutions 
designed to take on such an emergency planning role.265 
Suppose states create institutions designed to permanently plan 
and prepare for judicial administration during times of emergency—
emergency courts. Emergency courts would be tasked not just with 
calling sessions in an unaffected area, but also with handling the 
coordination issues that were not performed after Katrina. That is, 
emergency courts could provide a clearinghouse for such subjects as 
planning for transfer of prisoners; tracking and making public 
updated contact information for defense attorneys and prosecutors; 
making public lists of prisoners and where they are located; 
monitoring hearings; ensuring adequate indigent defense; ensuring 
court deadlines are complied with; safeguarding records and 
evidence; and supervising efforts to locate witnesses and evidence. 
Given the Louisiana courts’ failure to respond to the emergency, 
it may seem surprising to focus on courts as exercising a future 
leadership role. Yet despite their relative lack of power as compared 
with the political branches, courts provide a natural center for 
planning to prevent criminal justice collapse and for decisionmaking 
to maintain the integrity of the criminal process during times of 
emergency. Courts are the “executive” within the criminal system, 
with authority to supervise operation of court facilities, correctional 
facilities, and prosecutors and defense lawyers appearing before 
 
 265. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1063(1) (2005) (permitting a judge to declare a 
mistrial if “[i]t is impossible for the trial to proceed in conformity with law . . . ,” but refusing to 
provide for an emergency court). The New York state courts developed novel procedures to 
restore administration of justice “surprisingly quickly,” without even a two week delay, and in a 
manner sensitive to individual rights after September 11, 2001, according to a report by the 
VERA institute. See OREN ROOT, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER EMERGENCY 
CONDITIONS: LESSONS FOLLOWING THE ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER (2002), 
http://www.vera.org/publications/publications_2c.asp?section_id=16&project_id=&sub_section_ 
id=5&publication_id=148&publication_content_id=210. 
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them,266 as well as to consolidate cases to examine systemic issues 
affecting their jurisdiction.267 Courts thus may have the best “on the 
ground” information about problems in administering criminal 
justice. 
Courts could maintain the legitimacy of the criminal system 
during an emergency by insisting on reasonable compliance with 
constitutional criminal procedure rules. For example, we argue that 
unlike the Louisiana courts, an emergency court should take the 
following six minimal steps: 
1. Require the state corrections department and prosecutors to 
make promptly available names and locations of all inmates 
to defense counsel and families; 
2. Conduct prompt triage hearings to release non-felony 
offenders, for whom due process should prevent indefinite 
detention, and waive or reduce statutory bail; 
3. For more serious offenses, insist that prompt hearings be 
held in which prosecutors decide whether to charge or accept 
guilty pleas with probation (to be supervised for evacuees in 
their new homes); 
4. Ensure full access to counsel at detention facilities; 
5. Conduct prompt hearings to ascertain adequacy of indigent 
defense counsel, solicit volunteer counsel if there is a 
shortage of local counsel, and evaluate the institutional 
adequacy of the indigent defense office; 
6. Insist on compliance with charge deadlines and speedy-trial 
deadlines, and if there is no compliance, entertain writs of 
habeas corpus—with priority for misdemeanor detainees. 
An emergency court should develop further emergency response 
procedures to the range of post-Katrina failures; our outline above 
 
 266. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (“Certain 
implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice . . . .”); see generally Garrett, 
supra note 8. Criminal justice actors come from multiple branches of government, each 
answering to different authorities and constituencies. A crisis can make it impossible to 
reassemble in one place all of the necessary players. Advance emergency planning becomes 
crucial for such a necessarily decentralized system, and courts are natural conveners of that 
planning. 
 267. The Supreme Court has long recognized that consolidation of cases falls within 
“implied powers” of courts. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (“[T]he power to 
stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of 
the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for 
litigants.”). 
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addresses only some of the glaring constitutional violations tolerated 
for many months without even investigative hearings by the 
Louisiana courts.268 
Additional advance planning should involve prosecutors, defense 
counsel, and law enforcement. The court ideally would continue to 
evaluate emergency criminal justice needs and then seek to raise 
baseline levels of resources in the criminal system. For example, the 
New Orleans courts have pressed a reevaluation of the indigent 
defense office in New Orleans, which, based on the Department of 
Justice’s recommendations, may finally lead to a constitutionally 
adequate system. A focus on emergency needs may force other 
jurisdictions to reassess, before a crisis occurs, the costs of neglecting 
already borderline-constitutional indigent defense systems. 
C. Collaborative Criminal Justice 
Certain tasks might not be effectively handled by an emergency 
court alone. The court system has little to say about operation of the 
local police department, which must conduct its own emergency 
planning and preparations. Nor can the state courts convene outside 
state and federal assistance for local agencies. Problems of 
coordination between states and with the federal government call for 
added mutual assistance and collaboration regarding criminal justice 
emergencies. Existing mutual aid programs coordinate only the 
provision of law enforcement and National Guard troops.269 
Coordinated mutual assistance operations could extend to emergency 
courts, prosecution resources, defense resources, and correctional 
facilities. They could create opportunities for learning and 
 
 268. Local elected judges may be particularly unwilling to carry out threats to release 
prisoners whose constitutional rights have been violated. Perhaps judges appointed to an ad hoc 
emergency court would be more willing than elected local judges to enforce compliance. 
 269. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) provides for law 
enforcement assistance, but not other criminal justice support. See generally EMERGENCY 
MGMT. ASSISTANCE COMPACT, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT, available 
at http://www.emacweb.org/?564. The Select Committee Report describes its response post-
Katrina as disorganized. See SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND 
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 260, at 250–51 (“EMAC officials have 
acknowledged a significant population of ‘self-deployed’ personnel . . . . Due to the ad hoc 
nature of these ‘self-deployed’ officers, specific figures are not known. . . . Without an official 
deployment, the ‘self-deployed’ personnel were acting without proper authority, without 
liability protection, and without eligibility for expense reimbursement.”). 
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collaboration between state and local law enforcement across state 
lines and establish new baseline resources levels. 
The federal government could act as a center for such efforts. A 
federal agency could, upon the request of state or local government, 
establish an emergency court to resume administration of criminal 
justice.270 The authorizing federal statute could require state consent, 
but also require that the federal emergency court involve (to the 
extent possible) local judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers 
familiar with state law, or actors from nearby unaffected cities or 
states. Less intrusively, a federal agency could conduct training on 
operation of criminal justice during emergencies and supervise 
planning efforts. Further, financial assistance to maintain the basic 
operations of local criminal justice systems may be critical, 
particularly during the initial recovery period after an emergency. 
Perhaps new collaboration in emergency planning and assistance 
could counter the fragmented structure that contributed to the 
vulnerability of the Louisiana criminal justice system. 
CONCLUSION 
One Louisiana criminal defense lawyer expressed hope that 
“[w]e may see some lasting reform out of this tragedy. We have a 
criminal justice system that in some ways was already in crisis, and 
this could allow us to address those issues.”271 So far, the state 
legislative response merely centralized judicial emergency authority 
to suspend court deadlines. The federal government provided military 
assistance of limited use, and almost no criminal justice assistance. 
Meanwhile, the local police department all but dissolved. The local 
court system failed to resolve cases of thousands detained, and 
tolerated a range of constitutional violations and a defunct indigent 
defense system. Appellate courts largely failed to intervene, and in 
effect suspended the Constitution for months. 
 
 270. Perhaps a non-Article III court could be created by Congress, such as an Article I 
tribunal with administrative law judges that could handle state prosecutions. See N. Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982) (plurality opinion) (“[T]his Court 
has identified three situations [territorial courts, courts to establish and administer courts-
martial, and courts to adjudicate cases involving ‘public rights’] in which Art. III does not bar 
the creation of legislative courts.”); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and 
the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004) (discussing Congress’s 
power to create Article I tribunals). Alternatively, the federal emergency court could merely 
create infrastructure for state actors to maintain criminal adjudication. 
 271. King, supra note 207, at 11. 
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The end of the story is not in sight. More than a year after 
Hurricane Katrina, people remain in detention, facing charges, and 
uncompensated, and the system has not yet developed a plan to avoid 
future mass constitutional violations and disorder or to provide 
meaningful indigent criminal defense representation. Criminal 
procedure rules did not serve their intended roles after Katrina to 
protect individual liberties because the institutions of justice 
collapsed. Local judges, public defenders, prosecutors and police 
failed to intervene, even after months passed and they began to 
resume their work. Nor did the state or federal government provide 
timely or sufficient assistance. The individuals most affected were 
largely indigent, but also usually arrested for petty crimes for which 
they never had a hearing or a chance to pay bail to secure their 
release. 
These failures that lingered long after the hurricane were not 
surprising given the persistent inability of local criminal justice actors 
to address their own vulnerability during emergencies, particularly 
where doing so required allocating scant resources for unpopular 
causes such as indigent criminal defense. By shedding light on the 
nature and vast scope of criminal justice collapse after Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans, we have shown how criminal justice actors 
can benefit from rethinking their institutional preparedness. We 
propose the creation of emergency courts as one mechanism to 
ensure criminal procedure rules are followed to the extent possible, to 
coordinate and plan for responses during emergencies, and to obtain 
state and federal collaboration and resources. If governments do not 
commit to secure the basic operation of the criminal process during 
emergencies, the same fault lines may result in another entirely 
predictable criminal system collapse. 
